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Introduction
Lord Dunmore‟s War, or simply Dunmore‟s War, is typically known as the last Indian
War of the colonial period. In isolation, the events of this conflict appear to be unimportant in the
grand scheme of American history, yet they had far reaching impact. The tribes of the Ohio
River Valley saw these events as a threat to their future. The Lenape had already lost their
ancestral lands, being pushed westward by the force of European settlers. The Shawnee and Ohio
Haudenosaunee wished to prevent such an occurrence.1 The families along the Virginia frontier
looked to their future as well, having moved to the area in search of a better life. Another group
of Virginians, the eastern elites, looked to the same lands as potential sources of profit. This
thesis will show the negative impact of these factors on the loyalty of Virginians and American
Indians of the Ohio River Valley towards Great Britain.
In 1720, an ocean apart, two boys were born who would later face each other in battle
during Lord Dunmore‟s War.2 Andrew Lewis was born in Ireland of Huguenot and Scottish
ancestry. His family made their way to America and settled in Staunton, Virginia when Andrew
was about twelve years old. He was one of four boys and quickly acclimated to the frontier. He
accompanied his father in 1751 as they explored what would be called the Greenbrier River, so
named by his father when he “entangled himself in a bunch of green briers on the river.” 3 During
the French and Indian War, Andrew sustained multiple injuries and was imprisoned for a time by
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the French. Afterwards he became county-lieutenant for Augusta County and a member of the
Virginia House of Burgesses. He was over six feet tall and of stern countenance. It was said that
in 1768 the governor of New York commented, “The earth seemed to tremble under him as he
walked along.”4 Andrew Lewis‟s reserved demeanor garnered him respect, though not the
widespread love given to his younger brother and fellow soldier, Charles.5
In North America, the other boy was named Colesquo of the Mekoche (Maquachake)
division of Shawnee. He would be known to the English as Cornstalk. His Mekoche kin were the
peacemakers of the Shawnee people, and Cornstalk became a military leader among them. He
fought against the English in the French and Indian War, and later led a raid on the Muddy Creek
settlement in Greenbrier during Pontiac‟s War. When Colonel Henry Bouquet required hostages
as part of the peace treaty that ended that war, Cornstalk was one of them. He understood the
value of both peace and war, and has been described as “a large man, of commanding
appearance, oratorical ability, and intellectual grasp.” 6
Events leading up to the Battle of Point Pleasant, often referred to as the only battle of the
war, seem a natural enough cause for conflict. However, the men involved later felt, and some
stated, that it was brought about by the machinations of a duplicitous royal governor. To these
men, both European and American Indian, Lord Dunmore‟s War came to be intrinsically
connected to the American Revolution and their futures. However, even if the Battle of Point
4
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Pleasant had been the only battle, it is not sufficient to simply look to this altercation for
explanation of historical significance. The difficulties that led to this conflict had been festering
since, at the very least, the conclusion of the French and Indian War. Questions of boundary lines
provided the foundation for it. Thus, critical assessments must first be made of the treaties that
had repeatedly redrawn the boundary through this land, and those people who had consented to
them. Some wars may be inevitable, and eventually the matter of land needed to be settled – but
this war, at this time, was not.7
There are many lingering questions about Dunmore‟s War. Why did John Connolly,
Dunmore‟s representative at what is now Pittsburgh, circulate a letter claiming an Indian War
was imminent when others on the frontier saw no such inevitability? Why is Point Pleasant
typically listed as the only battle when, also at Dunmore‟s order, there was an expedition against
the Shawnee town of Wakatomika? What was Dunmore‟s motivation when he promised his
support to the Lenape in exchange for Captain White Eyes‟s assistance? Why are Connolly‟s
Virginians and Lewis‟s Virginians looked at as the same? Most importantly, how did these
events shape the actions and loyalties of these men in its aftermath?
The frontier militia at Point Pleasant went from one theater of war to another, and it was
Andrew Lewis who helped drive Dunmore from Virginia during the American Revolution. After
Point Pleasant, the division under Lord Dunmore drafted the Fort Gower Resolves before even
reaching home. Then Andrew Lewis‟s division, upon reaching their homes in Augusta,
Botetourt, and Fincastle counties, proceeded to draft fiery declarations against Great Britain.
7

Claims of the war‟s inevitability have been made by historians in the past. One example is Jacob Richards
Dodge, Red Men of the Ohio Valley (Springfield, OH: Ruralist Publishing Company, 1860), 139. However, this was
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Cornstalk put his life on the line attempting to maintain peace between the Shawnee and
American colonists. In isolation, these things are merely interesting. In conjunction, they are
significant.
It is difficult to trace the evolving perspectives of historians on Lord Dunmore‟s War.
Most have focused solely on the Battle of Point Pleasant, which was not the first or last military
action that took place. Such myopic views misconstrue events. Often, oversimplified portrayals
bear no resemblance to what actually occurred, and additional research has been little and far
between. Overall, there has been a gradual progression of opinion.
One of the first accounts of Lord Dunmore‟s War was in Burk‟s The History of Virginia:
From its First Settlement to the Present Day (1805), which described John Connolly as “a fit
instrument for executing plans of division and blood,” taking a view that the Indian War was
planned by Dunmore.8 This narrative, along with others from the period, was imbued with the
nationalist undertones that were so common after achieving American Independence. Many
historians from this period were particularly interested in Dunmore‟s potential treachery, likely
due to his status as representative of the crown. This includes Samuel Kercheval‟s History of the
Valley of Virginia (1833) and Charles Campbell‟s Introduction to the History of the Colony and
Ancient Dominion of Virginia (1847).
Brantz Mayer elaborated further on these theories in Tah-gah-jute; Or, Logan and
Cresap (1851), where he suggested that Dunmore had acted against the Shawnee in order to
cause “enmity and disaffection betwixt Virginians and Pennsylvanians” who disagreed on the
border of their colonies, thereby weakening colonial resolve to work together against the crown. 9
8
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Meanwhile, Alexander Scott Withers‟s Chronicles of Border Warfare (1831) stands out among
the nineteenth century histories. Withers listed the various theories that had been put forward by
his contemporaries, but was the first to blame increased white settlement rather than American
Indian aggression. Importantly, he argued against the popular idea that it was initiated by the
Captina and Yellow Creek murders which many have attributed it to.
The History of the United States of America (1849) by Richard Hildreth explained the
war through a comparison of Virginia and Pennsylvania. When word arrived of hostilities with
the American Indians, the former promoted war while the latter sought a peaceful resolution. He
says, “Conolly and others in the Virginia interest were bent on war, in which they were fully
supported by Governor Dunmore.”10 Not long after, George Bancroft wrote in his History of the
United States (1858) that Dunmore “called out the militia” with the support of other Virginians
“to restrain the backwoodsmen and end the miseries which distracted the frontier, and to look
after his own interests and his agents.”11 The word “distracted” seems to be key in the minds of
historians from this period. In Theodore Roosevelt‟s The Winning of the West (1889), he
suggested that Lord Dunmore believed he could distract the Virginians from their problems with
the crown if he could, as royal governor, protect them along the frontier.
In the shadow of the Imperial school, West Virginian historian Virgil A. Lewis wrote
about Lord Dunmore‟s War in multiple works. In History of West Virginia (1889), he
unequivocally stated that the British government‟s emissaries were urging the Ohio Indians to
attack the frontier, thus causing the conflict. He addresses this again in History of the Battle of
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Point Pleasant (1909), where Lewis stated that the immediate causes of the war “were the
hostilities on the border in the early spring of the year 1774,” without any mention of British
emissaries contributing to the problem.12 The cause of his shift in thinking is not immediately
clear, though it may be a reaction to the work of another West Virginian historian from the same
year. Livia Nye Simpson-Poffenbarger‟s The Battle of Point Pleasant (1909) specifies that
Dunmore had planned the attack to discourage colonists from “further agitation” on account of
the strained relationship between colonies and crown.13 Since she sees these events as being
connected to the impending revolution, she considers the Battle of Point Pleasant to be the actual
first battle of the American Revolution. This battle predates the Battles of Lexington and
Concord by six months. While some other historians have made a similar connection between
Dunmore‟s War and the political climate in the colonies, it is Simpson-Poffenbarger who goes
the farthest with this theory, and she may be part of the reason Lewis pulled back on the idea in
his own narrative.
Following the work of Lewis and Simpson-Poffenbarger, who were local historians,
interest in Lord Dunmore‟s War seemed to decline for many years. One of the only references to
this war from broader histories is from a volume of The American Nation: A History (1905).
Despite covering the war in only a paragraph and leaving out any explanation of what caused it,
George Elliott Howard labels the Battle of Point Pleasant as being “of the greatest national
importance,” echoing some earlier historians‟s claims that if not for the Point Pleasant victory

12
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“the treaty of 1783 might have fixed the western boundary of the United States at the
Alleghanies.”14
There are many examples of works where this conflict could have been listed, but was
not. Frederick Jackson Turner, famous for his “Frontier Thesis,” completely ignored Dunmore‟s
War in his The Frontier in American History (1921). Years later, interest began to slowly
increase again. Randolph Downes wrote an article titled “Dunmore‟s War: An Interpretation”
(1934), as well as a later book, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio (1968), with Alex Ross. In both
he maintained that the Shawnee were driven to war by the aggressive behavior of the
frontiersmen. In fact, this seems to be around the time that opinions shifted away from
Virginians as victims of Dunmore‟s machinations and towards Lord Dunmore‟s War being a
simple Indian War brought about by greedy Virginians looking to steal Shawnee land. However,
this is not universal. Jack M. Sosin, in Whitehall and the Wilderness (1966), refers to Dunmore‟s
War as “the coup Dunmore and his agent Connolly had carried out.”15 Further research seems to
have confirmed this opinion as Sosin uses similar language in a later work, The Revolutionary
Frontier, 1763-1783 (1967).
By the end of the twentieth century, the shift in thought was complete. Although
historians at this time lacked interest in Dunmore‟s War, it is still addressed in the context of
other historical topics, and there is a marked desire to recognize the struggles of the Shawnee and
other Ohio Valley tribes. Michael N. McConnell, in A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley
and its Peoples, 1724-1774 (1992), stated this war might more accurately be called the
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“Connolly-Dunmore War” given their determination to orchestrate the conflict.16 McConnell is
one example of historians who continue to indicate fault on the part of Lord Dunmore despite
their shifting focus to the plight of American Indians.
In the context of the American Indian struggle for survival in the face of European
colonization, Lord Dunmore‟s War is repeatedly listed as one of the many instances of white
colonizers preying on the native people. Gregory Evans Dowd‟s A Spirited Resistance: The
North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (1993), suggests that the war was caused
by the slaughter of Logan‟s “wife and children.”17 However, this negates the decades of struggle
that predated this incident. Colin G. Calloway, in The American Revolution in Indian Country
(1995), also cited the murder of Logan‟s relations as a key cause of the war. In Forced
Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, & the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia
(1999), Woody Holton asserted that Dunmore‟s War was a conflict devised by the Virginians to
justify an assault on the Shawnee to obtain Kentucky.
In recent decades, Lord Dunmore‟s War continues to be discussed primarily in the
context of other concerns. In The Appalachian Frontier: America’s First Surge Westward
(2003), John Caruso discussed many of the frontier conflicts that prompted the war, but of the
war itself stressed, “Most historians have greatly exaggerated the importance of the single-battle
conflict known as Lord Dunmore‟s War.”18 Michael J. Mullin, writing on Lord Dunmore‟s War
in American Indian History (2003), saw things differently. He said, “For both the American
16
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Indians and the colonists, the war carried important ramifications,” pointing to the majority of
the Shawnee having to move further southwest in its aftermath. 19 In Dominion of War (2005),
Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton believed that Connolly and Dunmore worked together to
cause the Indian War. Their assessment is that, by privately starting and openly squashing an
American Indian uprising, Dunmore believed he could increase British imperial influence and
control in Virginia.
In “Anarchy and Enterprise on the Imperial Frontier: Washington, Dunmore, Logan, and
Land in the Eighteenth-Century Ohio Valley” (2006), Barbara Rasmussen addressed the land
speculation issue and asserted Lord Dunmore‟s War occurred because “Cresap answered to John
Connolly, who answered to Dunmore, who increasingly answered to no one.”20 This seems to be
a frequent theme in the accounts of historians from the twenty-first century. Recent accounts
have been more attentive to the perspective of the Shawnee while still acknowledging, as did
Patrick Griffin in American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (2007), that
“Dunmore used the chaos and violence of the region to his own advantage.”21 Then, in Frontier
Country: The Politics of War in Early Pennsylvania (2016), Patrick Spero put forward a far more
unique theory. Dunmore and Connolly again take the roles of instigators, but for a different
purpose. Spero theorized that it was intended merely as justification for stronger Virginia militia
presence around Fort Pitt, now Pittsburgh, which would in turn strengthen the colony‟s claim to
the area being within Virginia‟s borders. This may have simply been the mistaken belief of
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Pennsylvanians who thought Virginia would go to any lengths to obtain the land, but it
nevertheless introduces a new element to consider.
The most comprehensive work to date is Glenn F. Williams‟s Dunmore’s War: The Last
Conflict of America’s Colonial Era (2018). Written from the perspective of a military historian,
Williams provided extensive detail regarding frontier disputes and the military tactics of Lord
Dunmore‟s War. While Williams rightly pointed out that many historians have oversimplified
these events and their causes, there remains work to be done. He refers to an understanding of
the treaties of Fort Stanwix, Hard Labor, and Lochaber as important to understand events. This is
true, but those treaties are not where the conflict begins. To better understand Lord Dunmore‟s
War in a new light, this thesis will look at the war from a social history perspective.
Chapter one will examine those treaties, the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and the culture
of localism that set the area west of the Blue Ridge apart from the rest of Virginia. The American
Indian tribes and the colonists along the frontier often had, at best, an uneasy peace. It ebbed and
flowed in an often predictable manner. Governor Dunmore‟s decision to install Captain John
Connolly at Fort Pitt offered a significant interruption to this predictability. Finally, chapter one
will examine the two incidents most frequently cited as instigating the war: the murder of Daniel
Boone‟s son and the Yellow Creek Massacre.
The behavior and motivations of two separate groups of Virginians are examined in
chapter two. The preparations of the southern division, led by Colonel Andrew Lewis, were
fraught with supply difficulties and a population often unhappy to leave their homes and
harvests. Conversely, the men of McDonald‟s Expedition made an early and direct assault on
Shawnee towns. These men would later become part of Dunmore‟s northern division. Their
attack on the town of Wakatomika is the actual first battle of the war.

11
Chapter three is the story of the Battle of Point Pleasant and Camp Charlotte agreement.
Though the southern division under Andrew Lewis were the only Virginians present at Point
Pleasant, Dunmore would also dispatch his own men under Captain William Crawford to
subjugate the Ohio Haudenosaunee. Finally, chapter four explores the Fort Gower Resolves and
the instructions provided by Augusta, Botetourt, and Fincastle counties for their representatives
to the Virginia Convention. These documents demonstrate the concerns of the men who had been
involved in Lord Dunmore‟s War and how these concerns fit with their loyalty to King George
III. With the eruption of the American Revolution in Massachusetts, more and more Virginians
believed their royal governor had been setting the Virginians up for failure at Point Pleasant.
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Chapter 1: “Beyond the Boundary of Virginia”
In many respects, the Virginia frontier was a world of its own. In 1731 James Logan, the
provincial secretary of Pennsylvania, had written to the Commissioners for Trade and
Plantations, often called the Board of Trade. He requested that they “encourage the Government
of Virginia to extend their settlements beyond the mountains” for the purpose of protecting
British claims in America.1 Such was the prevailing attitude for a time. Virginia settlements
spread down the Shenandoah Valley and then to the western waters along the New River. 2
Virginia‟s frontier settlements were legitimized, at least in their eyes, by the Treaty of Lancaster
in 1744 where the Haudenosaunee ceded “all the Land in the said Colony of Virginia.” 3 While it
would not be the first or the last time the Haudenosaunee, also called the Six Nations, would
cede land that did not belong to them, it was precedent for the British government to recognize
their supposed authority to do so. When these settlers built homes as far as Virginia‟s western
waters, they did so with the understanding that their actions were acceptable, never expecting
they would later be told to give up decades of work and move east. As long as there was a
French threat to the west, the government had motivation to use settlers as a human barrier
against attack.
When the French and Indian War arrived, some settlers fled east while others steadfastly
remained. Those who stayed formed a fort chain along the frontier to protect against American
Indian attacks. By this time there was already a notable culture of localism which frustrated
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much of the eastern elite. The frontiersmen wished to do things their own way, in their own time,
and their individual families were their priorities. There was a downside to their tenacity. The
area became so dangerous during the war that deputy sheriffs refused to even travel there to
execute warrants.4 The trauma of warfare and fear of American Indian attacks created a complex
culture. They were influenced by their European backgrounds as well as American Indian
cultures they had been exposed to. Many on the frontier had spent time as the captive of a tribe,
only to retain parts of that tribe‟s culture and knowledge after their return from captivity. 5
The tribes of the Ohio River Valley came to call Virginians the “Long Knife” or “Big
Knife.”6 Likewise, American Indians were known to attack and kill people they called
“Virginians,” which had become “the catch-all term for land-hungry whites entering the country
that „belonged‟ to them.”7 Just as the term was a catch-all in the past, it remains one in modern
historical interpretations. However, Virginia was a big colony. The settlers of the Shenandoah
Valley and further southwest to the New River were quite separate from the settlers who would
later settle near Fort Pitt, though prejudice against American Indians was prevalent across the
frontier. It is important to distinguish between these groups when discussing their actions.
The possibility of new opportunities was the appeal of the New World for Europeans, and
colonists were accustomed to the idea that they could obtain more and more land as part of these
4
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opportunities. When the British government failed to continue supporting this expansion, it did
so for multiple reasons. First, the government wished to avoid further Indian Wars. It was a lofty
goal, but the Board of Trade believed that “due obedience” to their edicts would have resulted in
peace.8 Second, they wished to use the western land as a means of generating revenue. Providing
grants to settlers undermined their bottom line, and they had acquired considerable debt in the
French and Indian War.
Not only did this new land require a plan for distribution, but also required the formation
of new colonial governments to control it. The plan was written by the Board of Trade, approved
by the king, and official as of October 7, 1763. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 created a
boundary line protecting “any Lands beyond the Heads or Sources of any of the Rivers which
fall into the Atlantick Ocean from the West and North-West, or upon any Lands whatever,
which, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us as aforesaid, are reserved to the said
Indians, or any of them.”9 This is the description by which the Proclamation Line was drawn.
Royal governors were prohibited from granting lands beyond that line, and any colonist who had
settled beyond it was to move back east. After decades of using frontier settlers for protection,
the government‟s priorities had changed. The effect this would have on frontier loyalty to the
crown was something the government failed to foresee.
However, the Board of Trade‟s intention was far more complex than it seems at first
glance. In a report on Indian affairs in 1768, they referred to this potential line as “mere
provisional arrangements” to placate the American Indians until they chose to sell, or otherwise
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cede, further territory.10 Plans had been made under the leadership of William Petty, Earl of
Shelburne, who then retired from the Board of Trade on September 2, 1763. His successor was
left to create a final document based on the deliberations which had already occurred. That
document was finalized just a month later. Though extensive consideration had gone into its
planning, the final form condensed a wealth of imperial policy into a brief proclamation lacking
the nuance of those deliberations.
A report from the Board of Trade to the king in 1763 discussed their deliberations in far
more detail than the final proclamation, as well as specifying one very important exception they
envisioned. They wrote, “On the other hand some settlements have actually been made under the
Government of Virginia; beyond the great mountains in the forks of the Ohio, between the main
branch of that river and the great Conoway river, which do not yet interfere with any claims of
the Indians and which it would be equally unjust and impolitic to break up and destroy.” 11 If this
accurately expresses the true intention of the proclamation line, that may explain why there was
not more done to enforce it along the Virginia frontier. Unfortunately, it is not clear what they
intended to excuse by this logic. Instead, it became a gray area. Virginians found themselves
waiting for years to see if land grants promised to French and Indian War veterans by this very
same proclamation would be fulfilled.12
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It is notable that the line did not recognize the western land as belonging to the American
Indian tribes, nor did it recognize the tribes‟s right to self-government. Instead, it was land set
aside for their use for so long as the king permitted it. The king considered these tribes his
subjects, even if they did not see themselves as such. Accordingly, the proclamation specified the
British right to establish forts and trading posts west of the line without requiring American
Indian permission. Licensed traders were also permitted to cross, with the requirement that they
not trade in alcohol or weapons. This is a requirement that was frequently ignored.
There was also a social cost to this boundary line. In spite of the cost in lives, the earlier
wars between American Indian tribes and English colonies had formed new relationships which
were then torn apart. Former captives who had been adopted into tribes found themselves in
between societies. This was true whether it meant giving up relationships with adopted families
or attempting to readjust to cultural norms they no longer found satisfactory. There are
documented examples of this difficulty being felt by both sides, including an Ohio
Haudenosaunee man risking death to see his Virginian wife safely to her relatives after
Bouquet‟s expedition forced the tribe to return all captives. This was among the terms of many
treaties, and captives did not have the option of staying with those they had grown to appreciate.
Some captives would return to find their original family gone, resulting in having lost two
families and arguably little benefit for having been returned. 13
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There were fewer cases where the adopted captives were not returned, and the British
government eventually gave up trying to enforce the terms on every last one. The complexity of
their situations is unlikely to have been understood by the Board of Trade, and indeed it could be
suggested that the strict separation of cultures demanded by the Proclamation Line resulted in
solidifying stereotypes of American Indians as “other” and ruining any chance the cultures may
have had to learn to live with each other in peace. This othering made it only too easy to continue
justifying land theft. After all, many of the types of white people who would ignore the boundary
would also ignore the other rules of the proclamation. The policies of the crown left those settlers
increasingly feeling like it was up to them to carve out the future they desired.
It had not been a question of if further treaties would seek to adjust the boundary line, but
when. Officially, the subsequent Treaty of Fort Stanwix was orchestrated by Sir William
Johnson, Superintendent of the Northern Indian Department. He had the help of others like
George Croghan, Pennsylvanian trader and Indian agent. Negotiations occurred at Fort Stanwix
in 1768. Part of the land to be discussed was that area of Virginia which Royal Proclamation
deliberations had implied was already acceptable for settlement, but the final document had
failed to include. This was that land south of the Ohio River and east of the Kanawha River, land
that is now the state of West Virginia. Of the twenty-seven chiefs listed in official documents as
in attendance at Fort Stanwix, twenty-four were Haudenosaunee. The other affected tribes were
represented only by Benevissica of the Shawnee and Killbuck and Turtleheart of the Lenape.14
The king‟s instructions had permitted Johnson to negotiate a new boundary line, but the
resulting deed from the Fort Stanwix negotiations extended this farther than planned. It was
signed on November 5, 1768, but none of the Shawnee or Lenape chiefs present are listed as
14
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having signed.15 This is typically understood to be both because they did not agree to the cession,
as well as their signatures being unnecessary under the Covenant Chain arrangement. The British
government recognized Haudenosaunee claims of having authority over the other tribes and the
ability to speak for them. Though Johnson had written to the government with explanation of this
changed boundary, stating that the Haudenosaunee insisted they had a right to the land farther
south and were offended by the idea it was not in their power to cede it, the king objected. In the
Earl of Hillsborough‟s response to Sir William Johnson from January 4, 1769, he expressed the
king‟s wishes. Johnson was to re-approach “the Six Nations as to make them understand that His
Majesty declines to accept of the large additional cession they wish to make to Him out of His
paternal tenderness and affection to them and their posterity and not from any doubt he entertains
of their right to the lands.”16
On April 25, 1769, the Board of Trade made a report to the king based on the Fort
Stanwix and Hard Labor treaties that had recently concluded. This report suggested the king was
fully supportive of moving the boundary farther west for the purpose of “allow[ing] Settlement
to be made by your Subjects.”17 However, they found that Captain John Stuart, Superintendent of
Indian affairs for the Southern Department, was the only one faithful to the instructions he had
received from the crown in his execution of the Treaty of Hard Labor. The line he negotiated
went, as desired, to Chiswell‟s lead mines in Virginia and up the New River to the Kanawha
River. If both superintendents had stuck to their instructions, this is where the two treaty
boundaries would have merged. In regard to Johnson‟s Treaty of Fort Stanwix, they wrote:
15
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Had the like attention to the real object of Negociation been shewn by your Majesty‟s
Superintendant for the Northern District and the same discretion used by him in treating
upon it with the Northern Indians, this difficult and embarrassing business would have
been, we humbly conceive, brought to a happy Issue, the Jealousies and suspicions of the
Indians, which have produced constant enmity and hostility, would have been removed. 18
The difficulty caused by these conflicting treaties was specific to the boundary of
Virginia, and the Board‟s resulting recommendation was a renegotiation with the Cherokee in
pursuit of a line that would pick up where the North Carolina line had been designated, then west
to where said line met the Holston River, and from there in a straight line to the junction of the
Ohio and Kanawha Rivers. This was meant to be a compromise that might keep all tribes happy,
but came with the requirement that the colony of Virginia pay for the additional land purchase
since it was Virginia that would benefit from it. This requirement was met, though the royal
government continued to drag out the granting of further lands even after the colony had
accepted the expense. As a further confirmation of the British government‟s intention to extend
Virginia‟s settlements westward, another letter from the Earl of Hillsborough specified, “It is not
however His Majesty‟s Intention that the Settlements of His Subjects should be carried beyond
the Boundary of Virginia, as proposed to be fixed near the Kanawa River.” 19
There was a legitimate reason for the British government, or at the very least the
government of Virginia, to control land cessions. Otherwise, “land jobbers” were known to
obtain land deeds by convincing two or three Indians to place their mark upon a deed in
exchange for alcohol, arms, or small gifts.20 Unscrupulous colonists did not care that a couple
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members of a tribe could hardly surrender land on behalf of all. Regardless of who controlled the
grants, the Shawnee soon made their dissatisfaction with the recent treaties known. While the
Shawnee towns were north of the Ohio River, they considered the area south of the river to be
their hunting grounds. They felt no loyalty towards the Haudenosaunee that would require their
cooperation with the cession.
However, these treaties were only the most recent to draw a line west of this area. In the
much earlier Treaty of Logg‟s Town, made in 1752, the Shawnee, Lenape, and Haudenosaunee
had ceded “the southern or eastern Parts of the River Ohio, called otherwise the Allagany.” 21 The
Board of Trade rejected Virginia‟s claims on the basis of this treaty, saying it was “vague and
void of precision.”22 This is a prime example of the problems with treaties between colonists and
American Indians, even though it was supported by the local government. The Shawnee were
present at Logg‟s Town, but there is no evidence they agreed to the treaty‟s terms on that
occasion either. More than likely, the Haudenosaunee again consented under the guise of the
Covenant Chain. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the colonists they had what they believed to be a
perfectly valid claim to the land already. When Sir William Johnson was forced to explain
himself to the Board of Trade regarding the Shawnee objections to the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, he
referred to their “fallacious pretences” and their “never having any right of soil.” 23
As a response to these land claims, the Shawnee began to make peace with other tribes in
an attempt to form a confederacy against the whites. After all, surely the tribes owed more
loyalty to one another than they did to the European colonizers, even if they had previous
21
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disagreements with one another. This began in 1769. While rumors of such a confederacy were
concerning to the British, they amounted to nothing. There are two interpretations of why this
danger did not come to pass. One version is that the Indian agents of the British Indian
Department worked diligently to avert disaster and were successful. This interpretation is
championed by Jack M. Sosin‟s “The British Indian Department and Dunmore‟s War.”
However, the version closer to the truth may be what is explained by Sami Lakomäki‟s
Gathering Together: The Shawnee People: “While the Shawnee diplomacy united likeminded
militants from many communities, it bred divisions within those communities between militant
and accommodationist factions.”24
Throughout the 1760s, small scale skirmishes and raids along the frontier had been
common place. Those who lived along the frontier had accepted this as a part of life, and word of
such events was not sufficient to result in war. Histories of Lord Dunmore‟s War often list the
skirmishes of 1774 as the reason for the Indian War, but what made them any different from
those of years previous? That is something those histories never adequately explain.
The location of the current city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on the forks of the Ohio, was
previously the location of Fort Duquesne. When it was captured by the English, they renamed it
Fort Pitt. It had been exceptionally strategic during the French and Indian War, but General
Thomas Gage removed the troops stationed there in October 1772. The removal of British forces
from an area claimed by the conflicting charters of two colonies, Virginia and Pennsylvania,
created a power vacuum just waiting for someone to take charge. George Washington, a part of
the eastern elite with aspirations of wealth through land speculation, had sought to direct Lord
Dunmore‟s attention towards the possibilities of this area. As typical of the period, the new royal
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governor had his own hopes of acquiring wealth while holding a position in the colonies, and he
took it upon himself to tour the area. This had been his intention as royal governor of New York
as well, and he had been furious when his promotion to Virginia interrupted those plans. 25
There were colonists living in the area around the fort, potentially ten thousand in
number.26 This meant settlement extremely close to the Ohio River and the tribes on the other
side. This makes a stark contrast to the frontier further south, where Virginians and American
Indians were separated by large expanses of hunting ground. Pennsylvania had done little to
reinforce their claims, while Virginia had acted to defend the area with royal permission at the
beginning of the French and Indian War. When Dunmore toured the area, these factors must
have stood out to him. Subsequently, he declared the area part of Augusta County, Virginia, and
he instituted John Connolly, a Pennsylvanian, as his agent at the fort on behalf of Virginia.
Connolly renamed the place Fort Dunmore, though not everyone along the frontier
bothered going by this new moniker.27 The actions of Connolly exacerbated tensions between
Virginia and Pennsylvania, and he is likely the cause of heightened aggression towards the
American Indians as well. The local militia, under his command and likely influenced by him,
began to behave with undisguised aggression towards their American Indian neighbors. During
drills, these militia men were known to aim their rifles across the river at friendly American
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Indians. Some would fire, though none of the rounds caused physical injury. The psychological
toll on the nearby American Indian settlements would have been another matter.28
In the course of the various frontier skirmishes blamed for the war, the story of Daniel
Boone‟s son is one of the most common. The families of Daniel Boone and Captain William
Russell made an attempt to settle Kentucky in 1773. On the journey their sons, James Boone and
Henry Russell, were traveling in a separate group and were attacked by a party including at least
one American Indian of their acquaintance. That was Big Jim, who Daniel Boone believed to be
Shawnee. Big Jim was frequently seen in the Watauga area, which was Cherokee territory. 29 A
letter from January 1774 referred to questions of “what Indians they were” and “whether the
Massacre is supposed to be owing to the Indians Jelousy of our settling near them, or to a private
Quarrel.”30 Settlers were concerned regarding whether this event might be connected to the
Shawnee attempts at a confederacy, but even among the settlers of southwestern Virginia it was
not a matter deemed an imminent threat. In fact, Captain William Russell explicitly urged scouts
to “avoide acting toward [the Cherokee] in a Hostile manner.”31
This was not the only event which might have caused concern with the Cherokee. There
was also the murder of an American Indian known as Cherokee Billy in June 1774 at the
Watauga settlement in present day Tennessee. The murderer was Isaac Crabtree, a man who had
narrowly escaped the attack that killed James Boone and Henry Russell. He may have acted from
28
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the trauma of that experience. A connection between Watauga and Virginia is questionable. The
settlement was west of North Carolina and many of its residents were likewise North Carolinian.
However, Virginians knew that “Virginian” was a catch-all term and anyone along the frontier
might suffer reprisals for Cherokee Billy‟s death. Major Arthur Campbell, justice of the peace
for Virginia‟s Fincastle County, wrote to Colonel William Preston of this concern. In his letter,
he specified that “a Letter from Col. Lewis […] would be of service at this time.” 32 Indeed,
Andrew Lewis was a logical person to ask for help. Despite that solemn disposition, he was
known to the Cherokee and had acted to get justice on their behalf after a group of Cherokee
travellers had been murdered by the Augusta Boys in 1765. 33
Though their concerns were legitimate, the matter was settled without further conflict. On
July 9, Major Arthur Campbell wrote again to report that the principle chiefs of the Cherokee
had met and denied having any part in the murder of James Boone and Henry Russell, or any
culpability in similar events of concern. They reported, though, that “the Raven with four others
had gone to the Shawanese early in the Spring, without the approbation of the Nation; and that
they expected he was killed as the Shawanese had killed one of their men lately in sight of their
Town.”34 Word came in October that the Cherokee chiefs had apprehended two guilty in the
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murder of Henry Russell and put one to death.35 The relationship between the Cherokee and
white settlers was peaceful, at least for the moment, and did not contribute to Dunmore‟s War.
There had been recent conflicts along the Ohio River in the spring of 1774, just as there
had been for years on the frontier. Then an event occurred which shocked even Virginians with
its brutality. On April 30, 1774, a group of Ohio Haudenosaunee from a town by the junction of
Yellow Creek and the Ohio River went across the river to Joshua Baker‟s. Baker sold alcohol to
some of the group, as apparently he had done many times before, thoroughly violating the Royal
Proclamation of 1763‟s prohibition on alcohol sales. Once several were drunk, a group of whites
led by Daniel Greathouse massacred them. Some more Ohio Haudenosaunee came across the
river to check on the first group, and they were killed as well. The twelve slain Ohio
Haudenosaunee included the brother and sister of Captain John Logan. The only survivor was a
baby, the child of Logan‟s sister and John Gibson, a Pennsylvanian trader. One of the men
involved later wrote of the massacre at Joshua Baker‟s, also called the Yellow Creek Massacre,
that “I was of the first and last of the active Officers who bore the Weight of that War.” 36 He
clearly believed, as have many, that the actions of Daniel Greathouse and his party were the
spark that lit the flame of Dunmore‟s War. This is the truth, but not the whole truth. By this
point, the white frontiersmen were acting based Connolly‟s claims of American Indian
hostilities.37
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Captain John Logan, often called Chief Logan, was the son of a French father (who was
adopted into the Oneida tribe as a child) and a Cayuga mother. 38 Logan had always been friendly
with white people and had stayed neutral during the French and Indian War. One account says
that, after hearing a white mother lament her inability to buy shoes for her young daughter,
Logan made the young girl a pair of moccasins. After years of such friendly and kind interactions
with the white people, he felt understandably betrayed and infuriated by the loss of his family.
He led a mourning war against the white settlers to exact revenge. 39 Mistakenly believing the
leader of the Yellow Creek Massacre to be Michael Cresap rather than Daniel Greathouse, Logan
said in a letter from July 21, 1774 that “white People killed my kin at Coneestoga a great while
ago, & I though[t nothing of that.] But you killed my kin again on Yellow Creek, and took m[y
cousin prisoner] then I thought I must kill too; and I have been three time[s to war since but] the
Indians is not Angry only myself.”40
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There are many sources who claim Logan was at the Battle of Point Pleasant and actively
involved in Lord Dunmore‟s War, but this is unlikely. Logan engaged in his mourning war, then
he went home. This is part of why Logan refused when Dunmore later invited him to join the
peace talks at Camp Charlotte. His quarrel had been a private one, and he had dealt with it in
accordance to American Indian custom. Though Logan dealt with his grief in his own way, these
events enraged fellow Ohio Haudenosaunee warriors, contributing to their willingness to join the
Shawnee at Point Pleasant. Even so, the larger conflict that became Dunmore‟s War still could
have been averted. What happened next, happened at Governor Dunmore‟s orders.
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Chapter 2: “Friend or Foe:” The Battle of Wakatomika
Throughout 1774, John Connolly used his position as Captain of Fort Pitt to solidify his
control and undermine his enemies. A June 14 report detailed his abuses of whites and American
Indians alike, from the theft of gunpowder from settlers to sending militia after friendly
American Indians. The only thing these American Indians had done wrong was to aid
Pennsylvanian traders. Trade was an important element of this conflict, as Connolly and
Dunmore repeatedly took steps to sever the trade between American Indians and Pennsylvanians,
attempting to present the Virginians at Fort Pitt as the only option for trade. It was one more way
they attempted to exert control over the area. Lord Dunmore granted the “exclusive privilege” of
Indian trade to three men, one of whom was Captain John Connolly. 1 How did Connolly‟s
actions propel inhabitants towards war? His efforts entailed abuse of inhabitants, spreading
claims of American Indian hostility, and a determination to attack American Indian towns.
Æneas Mackay, a magistrate of Pennsylvania‟s Westmoreland County, recounted the
destruction of his property at Connelly‟s order. He explained that they were “Robbed, Insulted
and Dragooned by Connelly and his militia.”2 The Pennsylvanians feared the American Indians
would retaliate against any white people, not limiting their revenge to the Virginians. Some of
Connolly‟s actions were in response to attacks against colonists, but closer examination of these
events shows colonists were the original aggressors. Often, these initial acts of aggression are
tied to the claims of danger purported by Connolly himself. Men like Captain Michael Cresap,
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one of the earliest colonists to attack the American Indians in 1774, directly attributed their
actions to a circular letter from Captain Connolly that led them to believe they were already at
war with the Shawnee.3
At first, the reaction of Pennsylvanian officials to Connolly‟s claimed authority had been
cautious. Pennsylvania Governor John Penn wrote, “I am much inclined to conclude that Mr.
Conolly hath, on this occasion, assumed powers which Lord Dunmore never gave him.”4 The
following months were a power struggle between representatives of Pennsylvania and Captain
Connolly. When Connolly insisted war was coming, others in the area were hopeful there could
be a peaceful resolution. Another Westmoreland County magistrate, Arthur St. Clair, claimed,
“Eight or nine people are killed; but whether it is only designed as revenge, or is really the
beginning of a war, we cannot yet judge.” 5 Their fears of war were emphatically connected to
Connolly‟s actions. Appealing to Lord Dunmore in Virginia, Penn cautioned that Connolly‟s
behavior “may have a dangerous tendency to involve the Colonies in general in an Indian War.”6
Whether enjoying his power too much, or acting under explicit instructions from Dunmore, the
actions of Connolly and his militia could not be interpreted as anything but provoking.
In June, over a month after the Yellow Creek Massacre, messengers arrived in
Pennsylvania with intelligence. Not only had the Shawnee taken steps to keep all white traders
among them safe in the violence‟s wake, but “their Chiefs have been strong enough to prevail
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over their rash and foolish men who wanted to take revenge upon the white people for their
loss.”7 Two small parties, friends of those who had been killed, partook in raids along the
frontier. This includes a small number of Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee from Wakatomika
who had joined Logan‟s party. As explained by Alexander McKee, the Deputy Indian Agent, the
Shawnee‟s actions demonstrated their desire to maintain peace, showing more restraint “than
those who ought to have been more rational.”8 McKee‟s opinion, similar to that of many
Pennsylvanians, was that there were better ways of dealing with matters than instigating war. Of
all the reports of Connolly‟s behavior, the one which best summarizes his determination to
foment conflict was the assertion that Connolly gave orders to “fall on every Indian they meet,
without respecting friend or foe.”9
In his memoir, Captain John Stuart recounted how a claim of the “hostile appearance” of
the Shawnee had arrived in Williamsburg while Andrew Lewis and his brother, Charles Lewis,
were in town fulfilling their duties in the House of Burgesses. 10 This included claims that the
traders, presumably those who had been among the Shawnee, had been killed. Though this later
proved false, the brothers met with Governor Dunmore in the interim to discuss plans for defense
of the frontier, and an expedition against the Shawnee in retaliation. It was determined that
Andrew Lewis would lead the southern division of men from Augusta, Botetourt, and Fincastle
counties. Lord Dunmore would command a northern division of men from Frederick County,
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Shenandoah County, and the settlements around Fort Pitt. At that time, Andrew Lewis had
command of the militia in Botetourt County, and Charles Lewis that of Augusta County. Both
men sent messages home, “requesting them to put themselves in a posture of defense.” 11
However, the potential threat must not have been convincing, as the House of Burgesses found
themselves more concerned about the Boston Port Bill than the supposed threat at their own
borders.
Among historians, there is a misconception regarding Virginian support of Dunmore‟s
War. Walter H. Mohr contended, “Although Dunmore was at this time on bad terms with his
legislature, yet so great was the interest of Virginia in land northwest of the Ohio that it loyally
supported the Governor‟s Indian War.”12 Much evidence counters this assertion. On June 10,
Governor Dunmore dispatched a circular letter to the county-lieutenants along the frontier. He
condemned the Virginia House of Burgesses for their failure to act regarding these events, an
assembly he had already dissolved for taking a stand against that Boston Port Bill. He took it
upon himself to order that the militia should be called up for the defense of the frontier. While
Connolly and Dunmore cried war, the men further south questioned matters.
Although Virginia‟s Fincastle County was clearly beyond the Proclamation Line, the
inhabitants had benefitted from the later treaties. The House of Burgesses created Fincastle
County in 1772, a measure approved by Governor Dunmore. Colonel William Christian, who
represented Fincastle in the assembly, and Colonel William Preston, the county-lieutenant,
fulfilled their legal duties publically and expressed their misgivings privately. “So desirous are
some of them for an Indian War,” wrote Christian, “tho I cant help fearing that it is the most
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worthless and the men least to be depended on.”13 Preston had apparently written his fears
already, for Christian continued: “You seem to signify that you don‟t think yourself warrantable
in ordering out the Militia unless we are actually invaded, that may be so, but I think you could
safely encourage men to rise and go out without expresly ordering them to do so.” 14
More than a month later, after repeated communications from Lord Dunmore, or from
others relaying Dunmore‟s most recent wishes, Preston was instructed to raise at least 250 men
for an expedition. Preston obediently penned a circular letter that seems calculated for a positive
response. He used persuasive language, highlighting the potential benefits of an expedition, and
promised pay for their service and potential valuable plunder. He reiterated that “it will be the
only Method of Settling a lasting Peace with all the Indians Tribes Arround us.” 15 Finally, he
framed it as an “Oppertunity we hav So long wished for.” 16 Whether this opportunity meant
lasting peace or valuable land and plunder is unclear. The eastern elite, land speculators long
frustrated by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, may have wished for such an excuse, but it is
questionable whether the colonists along the frontier agreed. Historian Woody Holton cites
Preston‟s claims of an opportunity and reiterates that Fincastle County, Preston‟s home, “was
west of the Proclamation Line.” 17 This is true, yet has nothing to do with the hostilities near Fort
Pitt. Draper‟s Meadows, that part of Fincastle County where Preston lived, was colonized before
the French and Indian War. It is likely that this was one of the settlements the Board of Trade
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had referred to when stating it would be unjust to destroy certain established communities.
Draper‟s Meadows was not very far past that initial Proclamation Line. His home was not in
Kentucky, and it was not some new encroachment that can thus be blamed for the heightened
tensions.
Though it would be months before they marched, the leaders of southwest Virginia
already had many concerns. In May, Captain Daniel Smith of Fincastle County had reported the
“great scarcity of Powder and Lead,” so scarce that “one half the people Could not raise five
Charges of Powder.”18 Even faced with the threat of fines for being so ill prepared, the colonists
on this part of the western waters simply answered that they did not know where it could be
found available to purchase. These concerns continued throughout the year. Colonel Christian
had offered to advance the money for the powder, lead, and meat necessary to support an
expedition to the Ohio, but that required finding powder for sale. Major Arthur Campbell wrote,
“Want of Powder for the Forts is a general cry, indeed I dont know what [the] Men, that goes out
will do for want of it.”19 Major James Robertson expressed this again by saying, “I should be
Sorry to Urge but there is no Possibility of Defending our Selves or doing any good Without
Amunition.”20 These concerns were raised by others as well and continued into the fall. On
September 8, Colonel Andrew Lewis cautioned Colonel Preston that any additional men Preston
might send would need to be sent with powder.21
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The attention of these southwest Virginia leaders was not solely on an expedition against
the Shawnee. It was equally on their defense. Colonel Preston issued orders in July for the
construction of at least one fort, urging strict discipline among the men protecting their homes. 22
While the men understood the need to protect the area, they also understood their families would
need food the following year. Major James Robertson explained to Preston that he was having to
work around the grain harvest, and only days later warned that there would be a war amongst
themselves, “without that of the Indians,” if he did not receive fresh reinforcements.23
Captain John Stuart later described Colonel Andrew Lewis‟s army as having “consisted
chiefly of young volunteers,” but getting volunteers was no easier than keeping their local forts
manned.24 Throughout the summer, reports had continued to spread of further attacks along the
frontier. It was not clear at the time that most, if not all, were likely connected to Logan‟s
retaliation. In August, Andrew Lewis wrote to Preston of his concern they might need to draft
men for lack of volunteers, a prospect he seemed to disdain.25 It was hardly his only worry.
Lewis had voiced concerns that Governor Dunmore “has taken it for granted that we would fit
out an Expedition,” and worried their preparations might not be up to par with Dunmore‟s
expectations.26 Given these concerns, besides other worries, it is hard to believe that these men
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were enthusiastically seeking war. Lewis did later think Dunmore would be pleasantly surprised
by them, but the men of the southern division did not know what they would be up against.
The plans of Dunmore and Connolly did not wait for Lewis‟s army. Connolly had
intended to lead approximately four hundred men to attack the Shawnee towns, but
circumstances kept delaying his departure. In July, it was decided that Major Angus McDonald
would lead the four hundred militia against the Upper Shawnee towns on the Muskingum
River.27 These Virginians were recruited from around the Fort Pitt area and counties nearby,
despite appearances that the tribes wished for peace. John Connolly expressed, “I am determined
no longer to be a dupe to [American Indians‟s] amicable professions, but, on the contrary, shall
pursue every measure to offend them.”28 Major McDonald had marched first to Wheeling, where
Fort Fincastle was built under the direction of McDonald and Captain William Crawford, a
Pennsylvanian who took a commission under Dunmore. With that well under way, McDonald
departed with his men, marching down the Ohio River to the mouth of Fish Creek, then west to
the Upper Shawnee towns on the Muskingum River.
One of these towns, Wakatomika, was settled in 1758 after the inhabitants fled from the
Wyoming Valley in what is now Pennsylvania. In the decade leading up to Dunmore‟s War, this
area had grown to include additional, smaller towns comprising both Shawnee and Ohio
Haudenosaunee. The choice of Wakatomika was a highly strategic one. Reports suggested it was
the inhabitants of these towns who were most disposed towards war, as opposed to the lower
Shawnee towns on the Scioto River. However, approximately the same time that McDonald was
en route to Wheeling, the Lenape Captain White Eyes reported the Shawnee had abandoned
27
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Wakatomika and moved to the lower towns, possibly to escape the recent violence. It is possible
that McDonald did not receive this news, as his demands upon reaching Wakatomika suggest he
believed the inhabitants to be in residence there.29 One historian claims that the Wakatomika
Shawnee had tired of waiting for attack and returned to their homes, rather than remaining on the
Scioto as White Eyes‟s report had suggested.30 This may be true, but no published contemporary
document states this, nor did McDonald report seeing any women and children during his
expedition.
On August 2, McDonald‟s forces encountered a group of about fifty American Indians
near Wakatomika who “had made blinds on the path side to waylay the party who they expected
to be coming against them.”31 After exchanging fire, McDonald regrouped his forces, left
twenty-five men to guard the wounded, and then pursued the American Indians who had fled.
The colonists followed them five miles towards the nearby Snakes‟s Town. After spotting more
American Indians concealed on the other side of the river bank, they called over and invited
them to come talk. These were Lenape, a tribe that had remained friendly to the white people and
McDonald was instructed to spare so long as they continued their friendly behavior. The
accounts are not entirely clear here, as they had claimed “we observed the Indians posted on the
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bank, intending to dispute our passage.”32 This presents multiple possibilities. Perhaps some of
the Lenape had defended Wakatomika with the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee, or
McDonald‟s forces assumed every American Indian they saw was aggressive without evidence.
The Lenape men brought a Ohio Haudenosaunee man with whom McDonald‟s force had
fought earlier in the day, and McDonald gave the man his demand that the Shawnee and Ohio
Haudenosaunee surrender their two white hostages from frontier raids. Glenn F. Williams‟s
Dunmore’s War states that McDonald sent an Ohio Haudenosaunee with a message he would
spare their homes if they complied, and that friendly Lenape went ahead of the army and warned
Shawnee to evacuate their towns, protecting their women and children. Alexander Scott
Withers‟s Chronicles of Border Warfare asserts that McDonald had allowed a warrior to go to
the towns to collect the chiefs who they claimed could authorize a peace, and, when he failed to
return, they assumed duplicity. It was at this point McDonald advanced, he says, only burning
the towns “to punish this duplicity and to render peace really desireable.” 33
While McDonald undoubtably wished to secure the hostages‟s safety as soon as possible,
the inference that McDonald was willing to let matters go after obtaining them is never explicitly
stated in any contemporary accounts. The goal of his expedition was not the recovery of two
hostages; it was the subjugation of the upper Shawnee towns. Dunmore‟s directions were
explicit:
I would recommend it to all officers going out on parties to make as many prisoners as
they can of women and children; and should you be so fortunate as to reduce those
savages to sue for peace, I would not grant it to them on any terms, till they were
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effectually chastised for their insolence, and then on no terms, without bringing in six of
their heads as hostages for their future good behaviour.34
Those towns attacked included Wakatomika and Snakes‟s Town. At one point, McDonald‟s men
entered a town to see the scalps of their men “hung up like Colours but the Town evacuated.”35
They burned all the homes, seventy acres of cornfields, and three hundred to four hundred
bushels of preserved corn. Governor Dunmore reported this to Lord Dartmouth by saying that
McDonald‟s men “destroyed their Town and totally erased their plantations.” 36 Afterwards,
ironically low in food themselves, and seeing no further American Indians, McDonald‟s men
marched back to Wheeling.37
What is clear about these events is that a group of American Indians, presumably
Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee, intentionally lay in wait to ambush the approaching army.
Whether to buy time for the people to evacuate again, as some historians imply, or merely to
make a stand rather than let the enemy burn their homes without challenge, these were not men
who unexpectedly found themselves in a battle. The Battle of Wakatomika marks the largest
known group of American Indians to challenge the colonists by this point during the hostilities of
1774.38 Also in the context of Dunmore‟s War, it was the first organized offensive by the
colonists with the intent of widespread destruction. Logan‟s party got revenge during the spring
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and summer of 1774, but this revenge did not include a confederacy to fight the Virginians en
masse. The Battle of Wakatomika did not improve relations on the frontier or encourage the
tribes to make peace. Instead, attacks along the frontier increased after giving the American
Indians even more to be angry about.
On August 7, days after the Battle of Wakatomika, Logan‟s party had found a new target
at Sinking Creek, just off the New River in Virginia. The property of Balthazar and Catherine
Lybrook also held a blockhouse, and in light of the recent threats several neighbors had joined
them there. On that Sunday morning, all the children were playing in the river outside when the
four warriors saw their opportunity. They murdered seven children, ranging in age from infant to
fourteen, and three were taken captive. A couple of days later, two of the captured boys, Jacob
Snidow and Thomas McGriff, took their chance to escape during the night. They found a place to
hide until morning and foraged edible plants until finding scouts from Fort Byrd who could help
them.39
Throughout the summer, accounts circulated along the Virginia frontier of further raids.
The inhabitants did not know what accounts to take seriously, or when they might expect the full
power of the Shawnee at their doorstep. At the same time the men of Augusta, Botetourt, and
Fincastle counties prepared to march under Andrew Lewis, they looked for ways to keep their
homes safe. Colonel William Preston lived near the Sinking Creek Massacre, and he responded
to the event by “demand[ing] 100 Men with proper Officers” from Pittsylvania County, their
neighbors to the east, to defend the frontier in their stead.40 Preston wrote to George Washington
that “[about] ten days ago, a small party killed five persons, mostly children, & took three
39
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prisoners about 15 miles from this place, which is greatly exposed. I began yesterday to build a
fort about my house for the defence of my family.”41
Colonel William Christian agreed there would be greater danger in their absence, urging
Preston to be sure he left “a considerable body of men” to protect Fincastle County. 42 Though
they would discuss the danger between themselves, it was another matter to watch their wives
and children worry. Colonel William Fleming wrote to his wife, the sister of Christian,
reassuring her that there were only two groups of American Indians raiding along the frontier,
with only three or four men in each group. He urged her to “give no Attention to any Reports you
hear that may Allarm You.”43
The Virginians were not the only ones fearing what might come. Although the Lenape
had, throughout 1774, proven themselves the friends of white people, the color of their skin
made them an easy target as well. In May, a Lenape named Joseph Wipey was murdered. This
particular murder was personal, but circumstances made it easier for the perpetrators to get away
with it. Arthur St. Clair had heard of the premeditated plans of John Hinkson and James Cooper
to commit the murder, and, in his capacity as magistrate of Westmoreland County, wrote
Hinkson a warning that he would be prosecuted if he went through with it. The perpetrators were
Pennsylvanians, as Dunmore later felt compelled to point out to Lord Dartmouth, but they shared
the same mentality as many from the Fort Pitt area. Wipey‟s body was first dumped in water and
covered by rocks. When Wipey was found, and St. Clair called for the coroner, the body
vanished once more and was not found again. St. Clair found his hands tied by the lack of
41
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evidence, though Governor Penn issued a proclamation offering a reward for Hinkson and
Cooper‟s capture. Though Dunmore used this situation as supposed evidence that the
Pennsylvanians had problems too, Governor Penn attempted to bring in the murderers and
reached out to the Lenape chiefs to let them know the measures he was taking. Meanwhile, John
Hinkson became one of multiple men from neighboring colonies who signed up to serve in
Dunmore‟s northern division.44
In September, Virginia militia in the Fort Pitt area fired on three Lenape men who had
been traveling to Croghan‟s home. None of the three were armed, and only one survived. Major
McDonald, the same officer who had led the attack on Wakatomika, offered £50 for the capture
of the guilty militiamen, but it was hard to do anything about the “lawless vagabonds” with “the
most infamous and abandonned characters” that were Connolly‟s men.45 Though the Lenape,
influenced by their war chief, Captain George White Eyes, remained peaceful and even aided the
Virginians, it should be acknowledged this was a highly strategic decision. They had lost lives as
well, and had friends among the tribes that had lost more. White Eyes spent his entire summer
traveling back and forth to the Shawnee, doing everything in his power to maintain the peace. He
had concluded what many of the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee did not yet realize, that their
losses in outright battle against the Long Knives would be far worse.
By the end of August, Lord Dunmore was on his way to Fort Pitt. There he met with
Deputy Indian Agent Alexander McKee and representatives of the Haudenosaunee, the Shawnee,
and the Lenape. Though he offered gifts to cover the graves of the deceased American Indians,
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he then listed what he saw as the many crimes of the Shawnee.46 This list went back to their
agreement with Colonel Bouquet, when they failed to return all white prisoners. Dunmore
claimed they never “truly buried the hatchet.”47 This one sided list was disingenuous, for he
overlooked the times over those same years that Virginians had committed crimes against the
Shawnee. Not that Virginians were the only guilty parties. In 1768, German settlers Frederick
Stump and John Ironcutter had plied their American Indian guests with alcohol, then murdered
them. Pennsylvania had avoided an Indian War afterwards, even though the events were eerily
similar to the Yellow Creek Massacre.48
There was only so much the Shawnee could say in reply, but they denied Dunmore‟s
assertion that they had never embraced peace. “It is true some foolish young people may have
found [a tomahawk] out of our sight, hid in the grass, and may have made use of it,” they said,
“but that tomahawk which we formerly held, has been long since buried, and we have not since
raised it.”49 What they did not say openly in this council, and felt unable to say publicly, was that
the Shawnee leadership had felt the Ohio Haudenosaunee, as a part of the Six Nations, had
misled their people and were responsible for everything that had occurred that year. However, as
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the Shawnee explained to two American Indians who had visited them from the Moravian
mission town, they were afraid to openly order the Ohio Haudenosaunee to leave. 50
It is unlikely this information would have mattered to Lord Dunmore. He and Connolly
had spent the summer persuading everyone that the Shawnee were the enemy, overlooking the
role of the Ohio Haudenosaunee, and he had no reason to change his tune at this late juncture. He
continued to insist the Shawnee, as a group, wished to harm Virginians. He closed the council by
extending an invitation to the Shawnee to speak with him at Fort Fincastle, or anywhere else
along the path he would soon take down the Ohio River. He expressed his desire, “to convince
you how ready the Big Knife is to do justice, at all times, even to their greatest enemies.” 51
The Shawnee had their own list of complaints. They maintained their hunting ground had
been stolen by treaties they did not consent to, and they objected to the continued presence of
white people on their land. Despite this, the Shawnee chiefs had spent the summer working
towards peace, even when their upper Shawnee towns had been destroyed by McDonald‟s
forces. These attempts did not prevent Dunmore and Connolly from achieving their objectives.
They had convinced Virginians of their claims of Shawnee hostility and impending war.
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Chapter 3: “Push On, Boys”: The Battle of Point Pleasant
At the beginning of September 1774, the southern division of the Virginia militia
assembled at Camp Union. This is now known as Lewisburg, West Virginia, but for them it was
the edge of Virginia‟s settlements on the western waters. They were ordered to march up the
Kanawha River and rendezvous with the northern division under the command of Governor
Dunmore. This southern division, under Colonel Andrew Lewis, included approximately 1,300
men. They were primarily from Augusta, Botetourt, and Fincastle counties. Additionally, they
were joined by individual companies from Culpeper, Dunmore (now Shenandoah), and Bedford
counties, as well as Captain Harrod‟s Kentucky Volunteers. The officers had spent all summer
cajoling their men in one fashion or another, trying to assemble adequate men and supplies for a
successful expedition.1 The Battle of Point Pleasant was important, not due to the scale of the
battle alone, but because it had the most significant influence on the loyalties of the Virginians
and the determination of the Shawnee.
The militia were not strangers to one another. They were brothers, sons, and neighbors.
Colonel Andrew Lewis‟s youngest brother, Charles, led the Augusta County men. Colonel
Charles Lewis was well known for his experience fighting American Indians along the frontier.
During Pontiac‟s War, Charles Lewis “pursued, overtook, and defeated” an American Indian
raiding party.2 While Andrew was known for his stoic and impressive demeanor, Charles was
friendly and loved by all. Doctor William Fleming, who served as a colonel in the Botetourt
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County militia, had graduated from the University of Edinburgh and served as a surgeon for the
British Navy. Both in their forties, Charles Lewis and William Fleming were among the most
experienced officers in the southern division, except perhaps for Andrew Lewis himself.
While McDonald‟s Expedition had set out with the clear intention of destroying Shawnee
towns, Andrew Lewis‟s division was subject to the evolving desires of Governor Dunmore.
Their immediate orders were to build a fort at the junction of the Kanawha and Ohio Rivers (now
Point Pleasant, West Virginia). Forts were permitted under multiple treaties and the Royal
Proclamation of 1763, but were likely to further complicate relations with the Shawnee.3 There
was also speculation the men might march across the river against the Shawnee afterwards. On
August 30, Andrew Lewis received a letter from Dunmore requesting he alter the southern
division‟s route. Dunmore proposed they instead meet the northern division at the mouth of the
Little Kanawha River (now Parkersburg, West Virginia). This new destination was
approximately 42 miles northeast of the initial destination, and Lewis replied that “it was not in
[his] Power to alter [their] rout[e].”4
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After their departure from Camp Union, the southern division stuck with the original plan
to travel up the New River, to the Kanawha River, and from there to its junction with the Ohio
River. Through the wilderness, land the Shawnee had reserved for hunting, the militia drove
cattle for fresh meat and pack-horses with other necessary supplies. Captain John Stuart wrote
that “few white men had ever seen the place.”5 Captain Matthew Arbuckle of Botetourt County
had explored the Kanawha River in his youth, one of the few white settlers who had done so, and
was appointed as the primary guide for Lewis‟s army. They had to be constantly on their guard,
meeting some resistance along the way. Letters from Andrew Lewis and William Christian
describe altercations along the march, where at least one of the militia was killed and another
wounded by American Indians watching their progress. Lewis predicted, “They will be picking
about us all [the] March.”6
The southern division arrived at the mouth of the Kanawha River on October 6. They
immediately began fortifying the area. Colonel Christian and his men from Fincastle County
were several days behind, and no one was certain what Governor Dunmore‟s latest plan entailed.
Over the next four days, messages were sent between Colonel Andrew Lewis‟s southern division
and Governor Dunmore. They had expected, after Lewis replied they could not change routes, to
be joined there by the Dunmore‟s army as the initial plan had specified. Instead of going down
the Ohio River from Fort Gower, Dunmore would change course and march on the Shawnee
towns directly, leaving the southern division without the expected reinforcements.
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On October 9, the messengers from Dunmore included trader William McCulloch. He
had previously met Captain Stuart in Philadelphia and, assuming Stuart would be with the
Virginia militia, sought him out. Their exchange was one that would stand out in Stuart‟s mind
for years to come. McCulloch described how he had “left the Shawanee towns and gone to the
Governor‟s camp,” prompting Stuart to ask his opinion of whether there might be a battle. 7
Though McCulloch did not mention seeing any warriors during his journey from Dunmore to
Lewis, he instead replied, “Aye, they will give you grinders, and that before long.”8
On the other side of the Ohio River, Cornstalk was leading a group of American Indian
warriors intent on attacking the Virginians before they could unite with Dunmore‟s army.
Though primarily Shawnee, his force was said to include men from the Lenape, Ohio
Haudenosaunee, Ottawa, and other nations.9 Cornstalk had previously attempted to maintain
peace, believing it the safest course for his people. On that night of October 9, Cornstalk offered
to cross the river and discuss peace with the southern division of Virginians. His men refused, so
the American Indian force crossed the river during the night. Whether or not the Shawnee had
buried the hatchet previously, they wanted to settle matters now. Captain White Eyes warned
Dunmore that “700 warriors were gon[e] to the South, to speak with the Army there, & that they
had been followed by another Nation, that they would begin with them, in the morning and their

7

Stuart, Indian Wars, 45.

8

Ibid.

9

Isaac Shelby to John Shelby, October 16, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History, 273.
Though men from multiple nations were present to fight against the Virginians, this does not necessarily reflect the
position of the rest of their tribe. The Lenape, for example, had worked to maintain peace with the colonists all
summer. However, it is entirely possible that a number of their men disagreed and decided to fight alongside the
Shawnee.

48
business would be over by Breakfast time. and then they would speak with his Lordship.”10 It
does not appear Andrew Lewis‟s camp received any warning.
Before dawn on October 10, two small hunting parties left camp to supplement their diet
with wild game. Joseph Hughey and James Mooney traveled northeast along the course of the
Ohio River. Rather than deer, what they found two or three miles from camp was Cornstalk‟s
army making last minute preparations for battle. The American Indians fired on the two men
immediately. Hughey was killed, but Mooney escaped. He made it back to the camp just before
dawn and hurriedly warned everyone of the approaching enemy. He claimed there had been
“above five acres of land covered with Indians, as thick as they could stand beside another.” 11
Despite this report, Colonel Andrew Lewis and his officers did not expect they would
encounter so substantial a force as Cornstalk‟s army turned out to be. Small groups of American
Indians had watched their progress since they left Camp Union, and they thought it was another
such group. To investigate the threat, Andrew Lewis sent out two detachments under Colonel
Charles Lewis, with 150 Augusta men, and Colonel William Fleming, with 150 Botetourt men. 12
Captain John Stuart explained the decision by writing, “These were composed of the companies
commanded by the oldest captains; and the junior captains were ordered to stay in camp, to aid
the others as occasion would require.”13 Andrew Lewis did not send all the troops under the
same officers they had traveled under, but he was working with a force that had been caught by
surprise. This was a decision that he later faced heavy criticism for.
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The number of men in either army is debateable. Historians, and even contemporary
accounts, have given varied estimates. Based on Colonel Fleming‟s records, Colonel Andrew
Lewis would have had approximately one thousand men at Point Pleasant when Cornstalk‟s
force attacked, not all of whom were fit for duty. 14 Colonel Christian had an additional three
hundred men, yet they had not arrived. A number for Cornstalk‟s force is more difficult. The
most accurate number may be Captain White Eyes‟s warning of seven hundred men, or perhaps a
little higher. During the battle, American Indians used taunts as a military tactic, including
claims of having 1,100 men with more on the way.15 They also hid their dead, concealing bodies
under bushes or by throwing them in the river. Fighting began at dawn and continued until
sunset, with Lewis dispatching reinforcements as needed. Though most of his army may have
fought that day, there was never more than four hundred Virginians engaged in fighting at one
time. The officers also had difficulty with some men refusing to go near the fighting, or refusing
to fight under anyone but their own officers.16 Sami Lakomäki claims the Shawnee were “badly
outnumbered” at Point Pleasant.17 It is likely Lewis‟s army outnumbered Cornstalk‟s overall, but
“badly” is subjective.
The question of numbers does not detract from the valor of Cornstalk or his men during
this engagement. Cornstalk clearly impressed the Virginians, with many mentioning him in their
accounts afterwards. Though he preferred the idea of peace, there is no doubt he served his men
14
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admirably as a war leader. Those in the battle could hear Cornstalk shouting encouragement to
all the American Indians fighting with him, and it was said he killed one of his own who
attempted to retreat “in a cowardly manner.” 18 His actions, wholeheartedly leading the American
Indian force despite his personal misgivings, showed his loyalty was to his men first and
foremost. As Stuart explained, “None will suppose that we had a contemptible enemy to do with,
who has any knowledge of the exploits performed by them.” 19
Neither of the veteran officers that Andrew Lewis sent into the field escaped without
injury. Charles Lewis had been known for years as a fighter with great success against American
Indians, but his luck did not hold at Point Pleasant. He was shot on the battlefield, caught in the
open while speaking to his men. Though a mortal injury, he calmly left the field and made his
own way back to camp. Colonel William Christian wrote, “He turned and handed his gun to a
man and walked to Camp telling the men as he passed along „I am wounded, but go you on and
be brave.‟”20 Charles resigned himself to his impending death by saying that he had at least
killed one of the enemy first. Another account notes his final words as, “Push on, boys. Don‟t
mind me.”21 Colonel Fleming was shot three times, twice in his left arm and once in the left side
of his chest. The chest wound exposed part of his left lung and it had to be pushed back inside
his body, a wound so gruesome that many expected him to die. Despite the intensity of his
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injuries, he also returned to camp with a cool and collected disposition. He encouraged those
men he passed, saying “not to mind him but to go up and fight.” 22
Shots slowed in the afternoon, but the battle continued until Cornstalk led his men in an
orderly retreat around sunset. Colonel Andrew Lewis had sent a message for Colonel Christian‟s
men to hurry, but they did not arrive until nearly midnight. It would have been a somber mood as
the southern division cared for their wounded and surveyed the dead. Of the Virginians, seventyfive were dead and 140 wounded. Their losses also extended beyond their own army. As they
checked the American Indian bodies on the battlefield, Virginian Thomas Collet found a body he
recognized. His brother, George Collet, had been taken as a child and adopted by American
Indians, choosing to fight with Cornstalk and dying in battle. Not that George was the only such
instance. Records show Tavenor Ross and John Ward, others who had been taken as children,
also fought on the side of their American Indian families. Clearly, blood was not all that mattered
when determining their loyalty.
At the time, no one was certain what losses Cornstalk‟s army had sustained. In the
months afterwards, Cornstalk requested permission to return to the battlefield and bury any
remaining dead who had served under him. He was accompanied by Captain William Russell,
with whom Cornstalk spoke about the battle. Based on Russell‟s information, the American
Indians lost eighty men in the battle, with another twenty dying soon after of their injuries, and
“a great number” wounded.23 The Battle of Point Pleasant had the highest casualties of Lord
Dunmore‟s War, often making it the only battle remembered by historians.
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Colonel Andrew Lewis and his men spent the next week fortifying their position at Point
Pleasant and caring for their wounded. Colonel Fleming was expected to die of his chest wound,
but he survived a day, and then another day, and continued to improve. On October 13, a
message came from Governor Dunmore ordering Andrew Lewis to march towards the Shawnee
towns and join the northern division. The southern division wanted revenge for their losses at
Point Pleasant, but it was more important to care for their own first. It was not until October 17
that Andrew Lewis obeyed Dunmore and crossed the Ohio River.
Following their retreat, Cornstalk called a council of the Shawnee. He had led his men
into battle despite his misgivings, and now it was time to make a hard decision. “The Big Knife
is coming on us,” he warned, “and we shall all be killed.”24 He presented his people with two
options. Either the men should kill their women and children, fighting the Virginians until every
Shawnee man was dead, or they should immediately make peace. Considering the outcome of
the Battle of Point Pleasant, his warriors now agreed. It would be peace, on whatever terms the
Virginians were willing to offer.
Governor Dunmore had departed Fort Gower on October 11 with 1,200 men, marching
straight for the Shawnee towns. Those who accompanied him included Captain White Eyes and
Captain John Gibson. Gibson was a trader and his wife, Logan‟s sister, was murdered in the
Yellow Creek Massacre. He was leading men from West Augusta County and served as an
interpreter during negotiations.25 Once they found a good place to camp near the Shawnee and
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Ohio Haudenosaunee towns, Dunmore named it Camp Charlotte.26 By Dunmore‟s account, he
was unaware of the Battle of Point Pleasant when he departed Fort Gower. Captain Stuart later
disputed this, having heard claims to the contrary. He wrote that, on the day of the Battle of Point
Pleasant, Governor Dunmore was walking with Captain Connolly and some other officers when
he “observed to the gentlemen that he expected by that time Colonel Lewis had hot work.” 27
Regardless, the men of the southern division were in good spirits when they crossed the
Ohio River to join Governor Dunmore. They had taken the time to mourn their dead and tend
their wounded. Now they were ready to follow Dunmore‟s orders, hoping to get revenge for their
losses along the way. Colonel Andrew Lewis had with him approximately 1,150 men, having left
behind very few able-bodied men with the wounded at Point Pleasant.28 Once they had gotten
close to the Shawnee towns and Camp Charlotte, Lewis received a message from Dunmore
stating that the governor was close to negotiating a peace with the Shawnee. This message
invited only Colonel Lewis, with his choice of officers, to meet with Dunmore at Camp
Charlotte. However that was interpreted, Lewis continued forward with all of his men. This
alarmed the Shawnee who were watching their progress, and they doubted Dunmore could
control the Virginians. A few hours later Lewis received another dispatch. He was now explicitly
ordered to halt his army.
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The difficulty, according to Lewis, was that the place where they received this order was
a bad place to make camp, so he marched on long enough to reach water before following orders.
The Shawnee interpreted this as an intention to attack their towns despite the negotiations. Lewis
and his men, on the other hand, claimed they had not intended to end up so close to the towns.
Dunmore had traders familiar with the area as his guides, but Lewis did not. It may be
impossible to say whether their direction was intentional. Certainly, the men were frustrated by
Dunmore‟s order after having fought a battle and marching all that way. One of Andrew Lewis‟s
sons later recounted, “All the army almost had lost relations, [Andrew Lewis] a favorite brother.
They could not be stopped.”29 Governor Dunmore, accompanied by White Fish, Captain Gibson,
and fifty men, visited the southern division at their camp to prevent further problems. To keep
the peace, Lewis had to post additional guards around his tent to protect Dunmore from the
army‟s frustrations.30
Now Dunmore announced that the entire southern division was a “hindrance” to the
peace he was negotiating, and ordered Lewis to take the entirety of his army back to Point
Pleasant.31 Not even Andrew Lewis, or any of his officers, were permitted at the negotiations
now. When considering the loyalty of the Virginians, their exclusion matters. They had fought a
battle without expected reinforcements, losing men they loved, and never received an
explanation of why Dunmore changed the plan. They then crossed the Ohio River, as ordered,
and now that seemed for nothing.
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Back at Camp Charlotte, Governor Dunmore discovered not all the American Indians
were as amenable to peace as the Shawnee. He had repeatedly labeled the Shawnee as
warmongers, and yet they alone were agreeing to all his terms. The terms were recorded in very
few places, but Major William Crawford of the northern division was present for the negotiations
and later shared the terms in a letter to George Washington. The first term was a requirement that
the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee return all people, white or black, and all horses stolen
from Virginians since Pontiac‟s War. In accordance with earlier treaties, no American Indian
was to go south of the Ohio River to hunt, and no whites were to go north of the Ohio River. As
a guarantee that they would return all people and property, the Shawnee were required to provide
“four chief men” as hostages.32 These may sound like considerable concessions, but they were
not. What Dunmore was really asking was that they abide by the terms offered at the end of
Bouquet‟s Expedition and the land cessions of prior treaties that were authorized by the
Haudenosaunee. None of the terms penalized the tribes for recent events, which was a pleasant
surprise for the Shawnee. The hostages would be treated well and returned as soon as the other
terms were met.
Although the Haudenosaunee had consented to the Fort Stanwix treaty granting
Virginians the disputed land, it was the Ohio Haudenosaunee who were now determined against
this new treaty. Captain Logan, weary of his grief, had consented to peace and to return the
prisoners he had taken. He refused to join the peace talks, but sent a message through Captain
Gibson, his brother-in-law and Dunmore‟s interpreter. This message captivated Virginians,
including Thomas Jefferson, who were impressed by the emotional speech. Logan reminded
them he had always been a friend of white people, forgiving previous wrongs, but said the
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Yellow Creek Massacre had been too much for him to bear. “This called on me for revenge,” he
said, “I have sought it: I have killed many: I have fully glutted my vengeance. For my country, I
rejoice at the beams of peace.”33
Though he wanted peace for his people, the rest of the Ohio Haudenosaunee disagreed.
They decided to sneak away, taking their plunder and moving north to Lake Erie where they
hoped to be outside the reach of Lord Dunmore. John Montour, who was part Haudenosaunee,
warned Dunmore of their plan. In response, Dunmore ordered Captain William Crawford to
pursue them with 240 men. Crawford departed under the pretence of returning to Fort Gower for
additional supplies. They were instead heading north, to where Montour said the Ohio
Haudenosaunee planned to meet one another for the journey. When they reached Seekonk, also
called Salt Lick Town, they encountered an Ohio Haudenosaunee man and killed him. This
action allowed many to get away, but not before Captain Crawford‟s men killed six and took
fourteen prisoner. More importantly, they freed colonists who had been prisoners. During this
raid, Captain Crawford destroyed the town.34
Once prevented from leaving, the Ohio Haudenosaunee had no choice but to consent to
the treaty as well. Very little would change. The land south of the Ohio River had already,
supposedly, been ceded to Virginia. Colonists, unless they were traders, were already supposed
to stay on the south side. The only new term was the requirement to provide hostages, and
perhaps the ability to control the tribes through hostages is what Governor Dunmore wanted all
33
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along. It was something he had encouraged prior to McDonald‟s Expedition as well. In addition
to the four Shawnee hostages required by the Camp Charlotte agreement, Dunmore kept eleven
or twelve of the Ohio Haudenosaunee prisoners Captain Crawford had taken.35
All hostages were to be held until their tribes complied with the details of the Camp
Charlotte agreement. They took the Ohio Haudenosaunee prisoners to Fort Pitt. The identities of
these prisoners are unknown. The Shawnee hostages were chosen by their tribe and were taken to
Williamsburg. They were Cuttemwha (the Wolf), Genusa (the Judge), Wissecapoway (Captain
Morgan), and Newau.36 “They are tall, manly, well-shaped men,” observed Nicholas Cresswell,
“of a Copper colour with black hair, quick piercing eyes, and good features.” 37 They were
imposing, dressed in a mixture of white and Shawnee clothing, and their bodies were decorated
with silver and vermillion. In their time as hostages, they would witness the chaos of the
governor fleeing and a revolution beginning.
The Camp Charlotte agreement was not a finalized treaty. It was an interim agreement,
with the understanding that Dunmore and the chiefs would meet at Fort Pitt in the spring to
finalize matters. Instead, the northern and southern divisions returned home to find that relations
between the colonies and Great Britain had worsened in their absence. While Dunmore‟s War
and the American Revolution are separate conflicts, the events that had transpired during this
Indian War would influence the loyalty of American colonists and American Indians alike.
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Chapter 4: “Of Liberty and Loyalty”: The Aftermath of Dunmore’s War
Lord Dunmore‟s War was not over once the armies marched home. The peace agreement
was temporary, and it took time for the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee to comply with
Dunmore‟s terms. There were also additional factors to be considered. Nothing had been done to
settle the land conflict between Virginia and Pennsylvania. Nothing had been determined about
whether the king would allow Virginians to settle land south of the Ohio River. The Virginia
militia had wanted to protect their homes against the threat Connolly had claimed existed, but
they had more on their minds. Many of the veterans would spend the rest of their lives
considering Dunmore‟s War and the American Revolution intertwined.
After Camp Charlotte, the northern division began their march home by way of Fort
Gower. While present, the officers of the northern division addressed the growing political
instability in the colonies. The political climate had been growing steadily worse, especially
since the Boston Port Act from the spring of that year. Having dealt with one perceived threat,
they believed that their time at Fort Gower was ideal for stating their loyalties. Not only did they
believe war with Britain might be on the horizon, but they had been involved in a dispute related
to Pennsylvania and Virginia‟s conflicting land claims. How could they support Boston if it
appeared they were snubbing Pennsylvania‟s sovereignty?
The officers noted it had been three months since they had received any news of events at
Boston or the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, though it appears they may have heard
rumors along the frontier.1 Since the northern division had joined the fight under a royal
governor, the officers drafted the document to clarify their position and loyalty for the benefit of
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their fellow Americans. It was approved unanimously. They claimed allegiance to King George
III and respect for Lord Dunmore, but referred to themselves as a “free People.” 2 Most
importantly, they asserted, “We resolve that we will exert every Power within us for the Defence
of American Liberty, and for the Support of her just Rights and Privileges; not in any precipitate,
riotous, or tumultous Manner, but when regularly called forth by the unanimous Voice of our
Countrymen.”3
Lieutenant Colonel Angus McDonald, promoted since the Battle of Wakatomika,
delivered a copy of the Fort Gower Resolves to the Virginia Gazette. He traveled to
Williamsburg along with the Shawnee hostages. They arrived in Williamsburg on December 17,
1774. From there, newspapers reprinted the Fort Gower Resolves in Pennsylvania, New York,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina by the end of January 1775. 4
Parliament was scandalized by the resolves when word reached them in March. They had
received no warning from Lord Dunmore and instead discovered the document in a copy of the
Virginia Gazette. The Marquis of Rockingham said that “a military league” of Dunmore‟s own
officers “pledg[ing] themselves to defend American Liberty with the sword” was “truly
alarming.”5 In fact, Rockingham‟s words go to the heart of what made the Fort Gower agreement
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so different from what had or would be published by individual counties. That they spoke as a
military body rather than as citizens sets their statement apart.
The southern division waited until they got home to their respective counties before
addressing the topic. Colonel Preston had borrowed men from Pittsylvania County to help guard
southwest Virginia in their absence, men that wanted to get home to their own families. Some
frontier families had gone east for safety and needed to travel home once their loved ones
returned from Point Pleasant. This gave them the benefit of hearing the latest news from
Philadelphia before choosing their words.6 Tradition calls them resolutions or resolves. Although
at Fort Gower the officers did write resolves, the writings of the individual counties were
responses to the resolves of the first Continental Congress. They served primarily to give
instructions to representatives from their individual counties for a Virginia convention.
Of the counties west of the Blue Ridge, the first to put their thoughts into words was
Fincastle County. The Fincastle Resolutions were dated January 20, 1775 and were published in
the Virginia Gazette on February 10. This document also differs from the Fort Gower Resolves
by listing the names of everyone on the committee who drafted it. These men explained that their
response would have been earlier had they not been fighting an Indian War. They claimed the
war was intended “to chastise those cruel and savage people for the many murders and
depredations they have committed amongst us.” 7 It was this area that had experienced many of
the raids over the summer, including the murder of seven children at Sinking Creek by Logan‟s
party. The crux of their document stated, “We declare, that we are deliberately and resolutely
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determined never to surrender [our liberty] to any power upon earth, but at the expense of our
lives.”8 These, Fincastle County claimed, were their “unpolished sentiments, of liberty and
loyalty.”9
The Augusta Resolves were published on March 16, 1775. They asserted they would not
“surrender” their freedoms “to any minister, to any parliament, or any body of men upon the
earth, by whom we are not represented.”10 They stated their willingness to sacrifice their lives to
protect their rights. Additionally, Augusta County recommended that the colony encourage the
manufacture of “salt, steel, wool cards, paper, and gunpowder.”11 This list holds more meaning
when the reader considers that Augusta‟s militia officers had spent the last year encountering
difficulties procuring supplies. Those supplies had been for an Indian War, but now they knew
what to expect when preparing for a revolution.
Published on March 11, 1775, the Botetourt Resolutions were likely the most shocking.
They contain language far more inflammatory than anything produced by Fort Gower, Augusta,
or Fincastle. Addressed to their chosen representatives, Colonel Andrew Lewis and Mr. John
Bowyer, they echoed the Fort Gower Resolves by stating that it was the king‟s councils, not
King George III, who they distrusted. “When the honest man of Boston, who has broke no law,
has his property wrested from him,” they said, “the hunter on the Allegany must take the
alarm.”12 As the tomahawk had been symbolic of war in Dunmore‟s talks with the American
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Indians, so too the men of the frontier saw it as symbolic for themselves. This was one of many
ways they had been shaped by their lives west of the Blue Ridge. Botetourt County was willing
to sacrifice their guns, tomahawks, and lives for king and country, but not their liberty. The men
of this area may have defined their liberty differently than men in Boston or Williamsburg. They
explained, “To range these woods on the same terms my father has done is not mine to give up; it
was not purchased by me, and purchased it was; it is entailed on my son, and the tenure is
sacred.”13 What others alluded to, the Virginians of Botetourt County said outright. They
warned, if their liberty was threatened, “The original purchase was blood, and mine shall seal the
surrender.”14
In the characterizations of Governor Dunmore, accounts usually accept one of two
extremes. Either he was a likeable man who attempted to help Virginia, or he was a manipulator
seeking to undermine the colonists. Likely, he was both. Virginians‟s praises of Dunmore at Fort
Gower and afterwards may have been sincere or formality. Nevertheless, he had certainly earned
the northern division‟s respect on their journey. He had a sense of humor, marching on foot,
enduring any hardships alongside the militia.15 Once he returned to Williamsburg, there was
more to do than simply catching up on any administrative matters he had missed. He returned to
communication from Lord Dartmouth, challenging Dunmore‟s motivations and behavior
regarding the recent conflict with the Shawnee. Dartmouth questioned the actions of Captain
Connolly, and what Connolly had been permitted to do in Dunmore‟s name. Not the least of the
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charges against Dunmore were that Connolly‟s militia had attacked friendly American Indians.
Dartmouth notes, “My Intelligence through a variety of other Channels, confirms these facts.”16
In response to the Earl of Dartmouth‟s letters, Dunmore‟s explanation attempted to shift
blame. It was the fault of the American Indians, he said. If it was not really their fault, then it was
the frontier Virginians. Failing that, it was the fault of Pennsylvanians attempting to drive a
wedge between the Virginians and the American Indians. “But My Lord,” he pleaded, “I have
learnt from experience that the established Authority of any government in America, and the
policy of Government at home, are both insufficient to restrain the Americans.”17 He was not
wrong. The colonists certainly had minds of their own, as recent events in Boston had shown.
Their culpability in Dunmore‟s War is a different question. Yet in his response to Dartmouth, it
was under no circumstances that he, Lord Dunmore, was to blame. It did not matter that he
commissioned Connolly to go take charge of Fort Pitt, or that Connolly encouraged panic over
the supposed disposition of the Shawnee.18
It especially did not matter that Dunmore had seen the Fort Pitt area as holding potential
for his land aspirations. In fact, he brought up the accusations that he was conspiring with land
jobbers to Lord Dartmouth. Although he had denied other accusations at length, he does not
specifically deny this one. Thomas H. Smith implied Dunmore‟s support for Virginia‟s land
claims was proof that he was a true friend of the colony. Smith said, “No one who owed his
position to an imperialistic government could have more vigorously defended a colony‟s
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claims.”19 It should be considered whether Dunmore was defending the colony‟s claims, or
defending his own hopes while in that colony.
In the aftermath of Dunmore‟s War, rumors circulated that left the men of the Virginia
frontier skeptical of Dunmore‟s motivations. They found it suspicious that, as some claimed,
there were American Indians meeting with Dunmore one day, and joining Cornstalk‟s attack on
Lewis‟s army the next.20 Many believed Dunmore had encouraged the Shawnee to attack.
Captain John Stuart reflected on these suspicions in his memoirs. He found the words of William
McCulloch the night before the Battle of Point Pleasant odd, still thinking about them years later.
He also mentioned a book author who claimed to be present on their expedition, but whose name
was not familiar to him. Stuart suspected the person was “in cog, and a creature of Lord
Dunmore.”21 After all, many of the colonists who were part of Dunmore‟s War had marched
already intent on revolution. Colonel Adam Stephen of the northern division was to attend the
first Continental Congress, but found matters on the frontier more pressing. It would be logical
that they would suspect Dunmore of having more than one thing on his mind as well. Lieutenant
James Trabue served in Dunmore‟s northern division and later told his brother, “The Governor
was certain of a war with Britain and there was nothing else talked about scarcely but the War.” 22
Another claim that can be found multiple times in the Virginia Gazette is that Dunmore
marched the northern division with “less than a gill of powder a man.”23 This is an unusual way
of measuring powder, but it got the point across. It would have been enough to fire
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approximately 20-25 rounds. Yet the claims were that Dunmore had purchased over three pounds
of powder per man, at least twelve times as much. The theory was that Dunmore would not have
marched with so little powder if he had any intention of being involved in a proper battle. In the
meantime, where was the rest of this scarce commodity that had been purchased for the
expedition? It is possible their suspicions were based on evidence, or they may have been
influenced by the Gunpowder Incident.24
The Gunpowder Incident occurred on April 21, 1775. The Battles of Lexington and
Concord had taken place on April 19. Two days later, in the early morning hours, Dunmore
ordered Virginia‟s gunpowder stores removed from the powder magazine in Williamsburg. 25 He
claimed there were rumors of a nearby slave uprising. The Virginians were incensed, not
believing his excuse. Meanwhile, Dunmore was writing to Dartmouth with a request for
additional arms. With more weapons, he said, he could control Virginia using “Indians, Negroes,
and other persons.”26 This was ironic given the excuse he had used for taking the gunpowder.
These events made it impossible for Governor Dunmore to travel to Fort Pitt to conclude
a formal treaty with the American Indians as previously planned. As early as February 1775,
reports had arrived from the frontier that the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee were eager to
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conclude a peace. Some said the Pennsylvanians were stirring up trouble, telling the tribes that
the Virginians would return with another army. 27 Whether or not that was true, there was reason
enough to be anxious when there were still hostages in the hands of Virginians. To buy himself
time and “quiet the minds of his countrymen,” Dunmore sent one hostage back to the Shawnee
under the care of Colonel Christian.28 In the months afterwards, Dunmore still made no
meaningful arrangements for the treaty. Captain Connolly and Virginia‟s House of Burgesses
both noted the delay.
The timing is uncertain, but at some point Connolly wrote to Dunmore and asked what he
was to do with the Haudenosaunee prisoners at Fort Pitt. Dunmore authorized Connolly to
convene a meeting of the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee to devise a treaty, return the
prisoners, and “endeavour to incline them to espouse the royal cause.”29 This may have been
around June 1775, as Connolly notes that Virginia‟s assembly appointed their own
representatives to review his “conduct” and work towards a treaty. 30 On June 24, 1775, the
Virginia Gazette reported the House of Burgesses had passed a resolution to placate the
concerned tribes and colonists along the Virginia frontier. They cited it as a necessity given “no
steps having been pursued by his Lordship for carrying on the said treaty, or delivering up the
Indian hostages, agreeable to the terms of said treaty.” 31 Among the names put forward to act as
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commissioners were George Washington and Andrew Lewis. The assembly also set aside up to
two thousand pounds to cover the expenses of a treaty.
As part of Virginia‟s efforts to maintain peace along the frontier, Captain James Wood
visited the Ohio tribes and invited them to Fort Pitt for the treaty. This conference was to occur
on September 10, 1775, almost a year after the Camp Charlotte agreement. Wood found that the
Shawnee, as well as sixteen other tribes, had received wampum from the British at Detroit. The
British were recruiting support from the American Indian tribes with which to attack the
colonists from the west. The Shawnee reassured Wood that “whatever they had received from
Fort Detroit they had buried in the ground, never more to rise.”32 Despite their commitment to
peace, the Shawnee had reason for concern. Genusa (the Judge) had arrived back at that town
just a day before Wood arrived. He came with a story that did not add up with the one Wood
told. Genusa believed that the Virginians‟s preparations for war were aimed at the Shawnee, and
that the only white man on their side was Governor Dunmore. He had “escaped” after learning
the Virginians intended to make him a slave and send him to another country, believing at least
one of the other hostages had been killed. What he had not realized, was that after he ran the
Virginians sent letters “directing all our People to treat him kindley and to let him Pass.” 33
Captain Wood immediately asked to share the Virginians‟s side of Genusa‟s story.
Though Genusa spent two months believing himself to have been on the run for his life, Wood
assured all the Shawnee that was not the case. He explained the dispute between the American
colonists and Great Britain, the actual dispute Genusa had witnessed them preparing for. The
Virginians had no plans to make the Shawnee hostages into slaves. Wood promised that
32
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Imcatewhaywa and Neawah were well. They were traveling to Fort Pitt with the Virginians, to
be returned at the same time everyone met for the treaty. They were even bringing Genusa‟s
clothes and other belongings that he had left behind in his haste. After hearing Wood‟s
explanation, the Shawnee replied, “We are fully satisfied with what you have told us, and hope
you will not think hard of us for his bad behaviour.”34 It seemed Genusa had misunderstood the
situation because he did not speak English, or at least not fluently. 35
On September 26, Cornstalk and Andrew Lewis met once more. They were both among
those gathered at Fort Pitt to negotiate a formal peace. Over the following days, more
representatives arrived.36 Lord Dunmore negotiated the Camp Charlotte agreement that this
would be based on, but things had changed. As part of the proceedings, the commissioners
explained they now spoke on behalf of the “United Colonies.”37 Captain White Eyes also took
the initiative to speak, announcing that the Lenape, Wyandot, Shawnee, and Ottawa had joined
together. This was a significant move, stating their autonomy from the Haudenosaunee after
years of the Covenant Chain serving as consent for every treaty.
A point of contention was the return of captives among the Shawnee. It had been a
requirement of the Camp Charlotte agreement, and Cornstalk had made several trips to return
people and property, but everyone knew there were more among the Shawnee. This had been a
problem since Pontiac‟s War, when the British Indian Agents had eventually just turned a blind
34
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eye. Cornstalk explained that some were unwilling to return to the white people, and it was
especially difficult for the Shawnee to surrender black people, or the children of black and
American Indian parents, who would be slaves among the Virginians. He also refused to give
hostages as he had the year before, since he had returned many people and horses in good faith.
The Shawnee admitted their young men had recently attacked south of the Ohio River, but word
came to the commissioners that the damage was worse than the Shawnee had acknowledged.
Doctor Thomas Walker replied, “If you will Continue to do us Mischeif you must not
Expect to be treated with such Lenity as you were in the Year 1764 by [Colonel Bouquet] and by
Lord Dunmore last fall.”38 The Shawnee offered to allow representatives of the Virginians to go
into the Shawnee towns to look for any people or property yet to be returned, but the Virginians
felt they would have a hard time locating anything in towns they were unfamiliar with. To keep
the peace, Kiashuta of the Ohio Haudenosaunee tried to broker a compromise. He said that he
believed the Virginians had demanded “nothing more of [the Shawnee] than what you‟ve a right
to ask of them.”39 He offered to send men into the Shawnee towns to make sure they returned all
people and property. However, White Eyes spoke up and stated, “I for my part do not love to
speak lies my young Men may go to the Towns but I am sure they will bring nothing back with
them as I have not heard my Grand Children the Shawanese promise their bretheren to deliver up
what belonged to them.”40 In the end, it was Nimwha, not Cornstalk, who promised on behalf of
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the Shawnee to relinquish anyone or anything belonging to Virginia.41 The Treaty of Fort Pitt
was completed on October 21, 1775.
Meanwhile, Dunmore promoted John Connolly to the rank of Major. Major Connolly had
traveled to meet with General Gage regarding the plan to use American Indians and African
slaves to their advantage. For his work on the American Indian aspect of their plan, Connolly
made a significant error. He assumed the loyalty of John Gibson. The trader who had been
married to Logan‟s sister and later joined the northern division under Dunmore now stood with
the revolutionaries. When Gibson received a letter from Connolly, asking that he take the
enclosed copy of Dunmore‟s speech to White Eyes, he immediately turned the documents over
to the West Augusta Committee of Safety. In the written speech, Dunmore acknowledged a belt
of wampum that Captain White Eyes had sent for King George III. White Eyes had been
strategically working to protect his people from further loss of land.42 Dunmore gave his
assurances that the king would protect the Lenape from the American colonists and asked that
White Eyes relay the same message to the Shawnee and Haudenosaunee. It was the letter
Connolly wrote to Gibson that was far more provocative. He warned Gibson about “what is now
41
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so ridiculously called patriotick spirit.”43 Word spread and Connolly and his companions were
arrested. In reflecting upon his arrest and imprisonment, Connolly lamented Gibson‟s
“dishonourable act.”44 Another letter, published in December, confessed, “I have, by direction
from his excellency lord Dunmore, prepared the Ohio Indians to act in concert with me against
his majesty‟s enemies in that quarter.”45
Back in Virginia, Dunmore worked on the plan to turn African slaves into a fighting
force. On November 7, 1775, Dunmore signed a proclamation offering freedom to any “indented
servants, negroes, or others (appertaining to rebels)” who joined the British army. 46 Lord
Dartmouth had approved of Dunmore‟s plans to use these individuals, as well as the American
Indians, as a fighting force. Dunmore‟s Ethiopian Regiment numbered between two hundred and
three hundred men within weeks of the proclamation. Between the Ethiopian Regiment and
attempts to turn American Indians against the American colonists, this led to the Declaration of
Independence‟s accusation regarding domestic insurrections.47
While this thesis has treated Lord Dunmore‟s War as a separate engagement from the
American Revolution, it is necessary to address why so many have considered them linked. The
colonies were already in a state of alarm in 1774, and it would be easy to feel every potential
source of danger to be connected. In retrospect, men who fought in both wars might easily
43
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believe Governor Dunmore had set them up in the Indian War. As John W. Shy expressed, “The
long-term causes of both Dunmore‟s war and the American Revolution are tightlyintertwined.”48 In both, the British government‟s attempts to control westward expansion
contributed to colonists‟s frustrations. There was also the idea that representatives of the king
believed an Indian War might distract the colonists enough to avert a rebellion, or that sowing
discontent between Virginia and Pennsylvania might prevent the colonies from uniting against
Britain. Otis K. Rice proposed such beliefs were “those of ultra-patriotic veterans, or of
historians and antiquarians who read their history of the Revolution backwards.” 49 This is quite
possible, though it does not change the similarities.
For the American Indians, these two wars are even more connected. Warren Hofstra
wrote that the events of Dunmore‟s War “were soon overshadowed by the American Revolution
and largely lost to the larger narrative of American history.” 50 However, “a turning point” was
from 1774 to 1775 for these tribes and their ongoing efforts to protect their lands and way of
life.51 The part of Dunmore‟s War that was between Virginia and Pennsylvania was about which
white people would control the Forks of the Ohio and, in turn, the land farther west. For the
tribes farther away from the colonies, like the Wyandot and Ottawa, siding with the British
seemed an easy way of trying to protect their lands. For the Shawnee and Lenape, it was a harder
decision. Their lands were closer to the colonies, and a wrong decision could have a higher cost.
Their hesitation bought the United Colonies time to improve their western defenses. Importantly,
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victory in Dunmore‟s War played a role in the eventual boundary lines when the American
Revolution concluded. Otherwise, that boundary likely would have been set at the Alleghanies. 52
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Conclusion
Woody Holton wrote, “An army of two thousand Virginians attacked the Shawnee and
Mingo towns on the Muskingum River, a northern tributary of the Ohio, and forced headmen to
deed all the land east of the Ohio River, including all of Kentucky, to Virginia.”1 This is similar
to the accounts given by many modern historians. In reality, approximately four hundred men,
primarily from the Fort Pitt area, marched on the upper Shawnee towns along the Muskingum
River. These Virginians were the inhabitants of disputed territory and influenced by Captain
John Connolly. The Battle of Wakatomika only served to infuriate the American Indians, doing
nothing to force a peace. In a later battle at Point Pleasant, approximately one thousand
Virginians fought against what was most likely seven hundred American Indians. The full army
of Virginians never fought or even marched together. The peace terms, asking the Shawnee to
cede land that the Haudenosaunee had ceded in previous treaties, was the work of the royal
governor, Lord Dunmore. Though the men of the southern division had no part in the peace,
Dunmore did not request any new cessions from the American Indians.
Despite the lack of research on Lord Dunmore‟s War, it had important ramifications. As
B. Scott Crawford said, it was “a culmination of twenty years of frontier warfare.”2 It shaped the
strategies used by the Lenape, Ohio Haudenosaunee, and Shawnee tribes to deal with the
ongoing expansion of white settlements. They attempted to work with the American colonists
towards peace, allowing those colonists to focus on their war with Great Britain. Once the
American Revolution concluded, the boundaries outlined by the Treaty of Paris resulted in a
larger United States than would have been probable without Dunmore‟s War.
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Certainly, this extension of the boundaries was an important outcome for the families of
the Virginia frontier. Following Dunmore‟s War, more colonists chose to move into what is now
West Virginia and Kentucky. George Washington recommended to the Continental Congress
that they appoint Andrew Lewis as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army. However,
rumors about poor leadership at Point Pleasant prevented the appointment. Andrew Lewis did
help lead the Virginia militia forces that eventually drove Governor Dunmore from Virginia and
was promoted to brigadier general during the American Revolution. He also attended a later
treaty with the American Indians at Fort Pitt in 1778. General Andrew Lewis died September 25,
1781 on his way home to Botetourt County. 3
Colonel William Fleming was unable to fight in the American Revolution after his
injuries at Point Pleasant, but he did recover and served as acting governor of Virginia in 1781. 4
However, many others did fight. One of many examples was Captain William Campbell of
Fincastle County. He was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and was one of the officers that led
patriot forces to victory at the Battle of King‟s Mountain. He was also known for being
particularly harsh towards loyalists.5
There were divisions within the Shawnee following Camp Charlotte. In November 1777,
Cornstalk visited Fort Randolph at Point Pleasant. During the visit, Cornstalk explained that it
had become much harder to convince the rest of the Shawnee to maintain neutrality. Captain
Matthew Arbuckle imprisoned him within the fort. It is possible he doubted Cornstalk‟s loyalty,
or believed by taking some Shawnee hostage he could force the rest of the tribe to maintain their

3

Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History, 427.

4

Ibid., 429.

5

Tillson, Gentry and Common Folk, 114-115.

76
neutrality. Cornstalk‟s son, Elinipsico, and some companions were detained as well when they
came looking for Cornstalk. A few days later some Ohio Haudenosaunee attacked nearby. Men
within Fort Randolph reacted by killing the four Shawnee before Captain Arbuckle could stop
them. This cost the Virginians a loyal and honest ally. 6 Another valuable ally was lost in 1778.
Captain White Eyes of the Lenape died while guiding some colonists toward hostile American
Indian towns. He had been hesitant to abandon neutrality, but was a willing guide. It was said he
died of smallpox, but there is evidence this may have been a cover up for his murder. He was
likely killed by American militiamen, the same men he was attempting to help. 7
Lord Dunmore‟s War was about land and loyalty. Decades of land disputes came to a
head at a time when the American colonies were poised for revolution. These disputes could
have been settled at any time, but were pushed to the forefront by the insistence of Governor
Dunmore and Captain John Connolly. Dunmore knew the loyalty of the Virginians was in
question, but it is unlikely he thought his own expedition would become one of the many reasons
colonists distrusted the British government. After Camp Charlotte, he endeavoured to turn the
American Indians against the United Colonies. Instead, the Indian War bought colonists more
time to prepare themselves for war with Great Britain.
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Appendix A:
Fort Gower Resolves1
At a Meeting of the Officers under the Command of his Excellency the Right Honourable
the EARL of DUNMORE, convened at Fort Gower, November 5, 1774, for the Purpose of
considering the Grievances of BRITISH AMERICA, an Officer present addressed the Meeting in
the following Words:
GENTLEMEN,
Having now concluded the Campaign, by the Assistance of Providence, with Honour and
Advantage to the Colony, and ourselves, it only remains that we should give our Country the
strongest Assurance that we are ready, at all Times, to the utmost of our Power, to maintain and
defend her just Rights and Privileges. We have lived about three Months in the Woods, without
any intelligence from Boston, or from the Delegates at Philadelphia. It is possible, from the
groundless Reports of designing Men, that our Countrymen may be jealous of the Use such a
Body would make of Arms in their Hands at this critical Juncture. That we a[r]e a respectable
Body is certain, when it is considered that we can live Weeks without Bread or Salt, that we can
sleep in the open Air without any Covering but that of the Canopy of Heaven, and that our Men
can march and shoot with any in the known World. Blessed with these Talents, let us solemnly
engage to one another, and our Country in particular, that we will use them to no Purpose but for
the Honour and Advantage of America in general, and of Virginia in particular. It behoves us
then, for the Satisfaction of our Country, that we should give them our real Sentiments, by Way
of Resolves, at this very alarming Crisis.
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Whereupon the Meeting made Choice of a Committee to draw up and prepare Resolves
for their Consideration, who immediately withdrew; and after some Time spent therein, reported,
that they had agreed to and prepared the following Resolves, which were read, maturely
considered, and agreed to, nemine contradicente, by the Meeting, and ordered to be published in
the Virginia Gazette.
Resolved, that we will bear the most faithful Allegiance to his Majesty King George III,,
whilst his Majesty delights to reign over a brave and free People; that we will, at the Expense of
Life, and every Thing dear and valuable, exert ourselves in Support of the Honour of his Crown
and the Dignity of the British Empire. But, as the Love of Liberty, and Attachment to the real
Interests and just Rights of America outweigh every other Consideration, we resolve, that we
will exert every Power within us for the Defence of American Liberty, and for the Support of her
just Rights and Privileges; not in any precipitate, riotous, or tumultous Manner, but when
regularly called forth by the unanimous Voice of our Countrymen.
Resolved, that we entertain the greate[st] Respect for his Excellency the Right
Honourable Lord [DU]NMORE, who commanded the Expedition against the Shawanese; and
who, we are confident, underwent the great Fatigue of this singular Campaign from no other
Motive than the true interest of this Country.
Signed by Order, and in Behalf of the whole Corps.
BENJAMIN ASHBY, Clerk
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Appendix B:
Fincastle Resolutions1
FINCASTLE, Jan. 20, 1775.
In obedience to the resolves of the Continental Congress, a meeting of the freeholdlers of
this county was held this day, who, after approving of the association framed by that august body
in behalf of all the colonies, and subscribing thereto, proceeded to the election of a committee, to
see the same carried punctually into execution, when the following Gentlemen were nominated:
Reverend Charles Cummings, Colonel William Preston, Colonel William Christian, Captain
Stephen Trigg, Major Arthur Campbell, Major William Inglis, Captain Walter Crockett, Captain
John Montgomery, Captain James McGavock, Captain William Campbell, Captain Thomas
Madison, Captian Daniel Smith, Captain William Russell, Captain Evan Shelby, and Lieutenant
William Edmondson.
After the election, the committee made choice of Colonel WILLIAM CHRISTIAN for
their chairman, and appointed Mr. David Campbell to be clerk.
The following address was then unanimously agreed to by the people of the county, and
is as follows:
To the Honourable Peyton Randolph, Esq; Richard Henry Lee, George Washington,
Patrick Henry, junior, Richard Bland, Benjamin Harrison, and Edmund Pendleton, Esquires, the
Delegates from this colony who attended the Continental Congress held at Philadelphia.
Gentlemen,
Had it not been for our remote situation, and the Indian war which we were lately
engaged in, to chastise those cruel and savage people for the many murders and depredations
1
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they have committed amongst us (now happily terminated, under the auspices of our present
worthy Governour, his Excellency the Right Honourable the Earl of Dunmore) we should before
this time have made known to you our thankfulness for the very important services you have
rendered to your country, in conjunction with the worthy Delegates from the other provinces.
Your noble efforts for reconciling the Mother Country and the Colonies, on rational and
constitutional principles, and your pacifick, steady, and uniform conduct in that arduous work,
entitle you to the esteem of all British America, and will immortalize you in the annals of your
country. We heartily concur in your resolutions, and shall, in every instance, strictly and
invariably adhere thereto.
We assure you, Gentlemen, and all our countrymen, that we are a people whose hearts
overflow with love and duty to our lawful soveriegn George III. whose illustrious house, for
several successive reigns, have been the guardians of the civil and religious rights and liberties of
British subjects, as settled at the glorious Revolution; that we are willing to risk our lives in the
service of his Majesty, for the support of the Protestant religion, and the rights and liberties of his
subjects, as they have been established by compact, law, and ancient charters.
We are heartily grieved at the differences which now subsist between the parent state and
the colonies, and most ardently wish to see harmony restored, on an equitable basis, and by the
most lenient measures that can be devised by the heart of man.
Many of us, and our forefathers, left our native land, considering it as a kingdom
subjected to inordinate power, and greatly abridged of its liberties. We crossed the Atlantick, and
explored this then uncultivated wilderness, bordering on many nations of savages, and
surrounded by mountains almost inaccessible to any but those very savages, who have
incessantly been committing barbarities and depredations on us since our first seating the
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country. These fatigues and dangers were patiently encountered, supported by the pleasing hope
of enjoying those rights and liberties which had been granted to Virginians and were denied us in
our native country, and of transmitting them inviolate to our posterity. But even to these remote
regions the hand of unlimited and unconstitutional power hath pursued us, to strip us of the
liberty and property with which God, nature, and the rights of humanity, have vested us. We are
ready and willing to contribute all in our power for the support of his Majesty‟s government, if
applied to constitutionally, and when the grants are made by our own representatives; but cannot
think of submitting our liberty or property to the power of a venal British parliament, or to the
will of a corrupt ministry.
We by no means desire to shake off our duty or allegiance to our lawful sovereign, but on
the contrary shall ever glory in being the loyal subjects of a Protestant prince, descended from
such illustrious progenitors, so long as we can enjoy the free exercise of our religion, as
Protestants, and our liberties and properties, as British subjects.
But if no pacifick measures shall be proposed or adopted by Great Britain, and our
enemies will attempt to dragoon us out of those inestimable privileges which we are entiteld to as
subjects, and to reduce us to a state of slavery, we declare, that we are deliberately and resolutely
determined never to surrender them to any power upon earth, but at the expense of our lives.
These are our real, though unpolished sentiments, of liberty and loyalty, and in them we
are resolved to live and die.
We are, Gentlemen, with the most perfect esteem and regard, your most obedient
servants.
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Appendix C:
Augusta Resolves1
MR. PINKNEY,
YOU are requested to give the following a place in your paper as soon as you possibly
can: In doing so you will oblige your customers in Augusta county.
After due notice given to the freeholders of Augusta county, to meet in Staunton for the
purpose of electing delegates to represent them in colony convention at the town of Richmond,
on the 20th day of this instant March, the freeholders of said county thought proper to refer the
choice of their delegates to the judgment of the committee, who, thus authorized by the general
voice of the people, met at the courthouse on the 22d day of February, and unanimously chose
Mr. Thomas Lewis and captain Samuel McDowell to represent them in the ensuing convention.
Instructions were then ordered to be drawn up by the reverent Alexander Balmain, Mr.
Samson Matthews, captain Alexander McClenachan, Mr. Michael Bowyer, Mr. William Lewis,
and captain George Matthews, or any three of them, and delivered to the delegates thus chosen,
which are as follow :
To Mr. Thomas Lewis and captain Samuel McDowell.
The committee of Augusta county, pursuant to the trust reposed in a colony convention,
proposed to be held in Richmond on the 20th of March instant. They desire that you may consider
the people of Augusta county as impressed with just sentiments of loyalty and allegiance to his
majesty king George, whose title to the imperial crown of Great Britain rests on no other
foundation than the liberty, and whose glory is inseparable from the happiness, of all his
subjects. We have also a respect for the parent state, which respect is founded on religion, on
1
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law, and the genuine principles of the constitution. On these principles do we earnestly desire to
see harmony and a good understanding restored between Great Britain and America. Many of us
and our forefathers left their native land, and explored this once savage wilderness, to enjoy the
free exercise of the rights of conscience, and of human nature: These rights we are fully resolved,
with our lives and fortunes, inviolably to preserve, nor will we surrender such inestimable
blessings, the purchase of toil and danger, to any minister, to any parliament, or any body of men
upon earth, by whom we are not represented, and in whose decisions therefore we have no voice.
We desire you to tender, in the most respectful terms, our grateful acknowledgements to
the late worthy delgates of this colony, for their wise, spirited, and patriotic exertions, in the
general congress, and to assure them that we will uniformly and religiously adhere to their
resolutions, prudently and generously formed for their country‟s good.
Fully convinced that the safety and happiness of America depend, next to the blessing of
Almighty God, on the unanimity and wisdom of her councils, we doubt not you will, on your
parts, comply with the recommendation of the late continental congress, appointing delegates
form this colony to meet in Philadelphia on the 10th of May next, unless American grievances be
redressed before that time; and as we are determined to maintain unimpaired that liberty which is
the gift of Heaven to the subjects of Britain‟s empire, we will most cordially join our countrymen
in such measures as may be deemed wise and necessary to secure and perpetuate the ancient,
just, and legal rights of this colony, and all British America.
As the state of this colony greatly demands that manufactures should be encouraged by
every possible means, we desire you to use your endeavours that bounties may be proposed by
the convention for the making of salt, steel, wool cards, paper, and gunpowder, and that, in the
mean time, a supply of ammunition be provided for the militia of this colony. We entirely agree
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in opinion with the gentlemen of Fairfax county, that a well regulated militia is the natural
strength, and staple security, of a free government, and therefore wish it might be recommended
by the convention to the officers and men of each county in Virginia to make themselves masters
of the military exercise, published by order of his majesty in the year 1764.
Placing our ultimate trust in the supreme disposer of every event, without whose gracious
interposition the wisest schemes may fail of success, we desire you to move the convention, that
some, which may appear to them most convenient, be set apart for imploring the blessing of
Almighty God in such plans as human wisdom and integrity may think necessary to adopt for
preserving AMERICA happy, virtous, and free.
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Appendix D:
Botetourt Resolutions1
To Col. ANDREW LEWIS, and Mr. JOHN BOWYER.
GENTLEMEN,
For your past service, you have our thanks, and we presume it is all the reward ye desire.
And as we have again committed you the greatest trust we can confer (that of appearing for us in
the great Council of the colony) we think it expedient ye hear our sentiments at this important
juncture. And first, we require you to represent us with hearts replete with the most grateful and
loyal veneration for the race of Brunswick, for they have been truly our fathers; and at the same
time the most dutiful affection for our Sovereign, of whose honest heart we cannot entertain any
diffidence; but sorry we are to add, that in his councils we can no longer confide: A set of
miscreants, unworthy to administer the laws of Britain‟s empire, have been permitted impiously
to sway. How unjustly, cruelly, and tyrannically, they have invaded our rights, we need not now
put you in mind. We only say, and we assert it with pride, that the subjects of Britain are ONE;
and when the honest man of Boston, who has broke no law, has his property wrested from him,
the hunter on the Allegany must take the alarm, and, as a FREEMAN of America, he will fly to
his Representatives and thus instruct them: Gentlemen, my gun, my tomahawk, my life, I desire
you to tender to the honour of my King and country; but my LIBERTY, to range these woods on
the same terms my father has done is not mine to give up; it was not purchased by me, and
purchased it was; it is entailed on my son, and the tenure is sacred. Watch over it, Gentlemen, for
to him it must descend unviolated, if my arm can defend it; but if not, if wicked power is

1
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permitted to prevail against me, the original purchase was blood, and mine shall seal the
surrender.
That our countrymen, and the world, may know our disposition, we choose that this be
published. And we have one request to add, that is, that the SONS of WORTH and FREEDOM
who appeared for us at Philadelphia will accept our most ardent, grateful acknowledgments; and
we hereby plight them our faith, that we will religiously observe their resolutions, and obey their
instructions, in contempt of our power, and temporary interest; and should the measures they
have wisely calculated for our relief fail, we will stand prepared for every Contingency. We are
Gentlemen, your dutiful, &c.
THE FREEHOLDERS OF BOTETOURT.
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